Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages by Daniels, Stephen & Martin, Joanne
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1990
Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages
Stephen Daniels
Joanne Martin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniels, Stephen and Martin, Joanne, "Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages" (1990). Minnesota Law Review. 2360.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2360
Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages*
Stephen Daniels**
Joanne Martin***
The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and
unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the
law.1
This graphic characterization of punitive damages comes
from an 1873 opinion by a member of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court. Still cited today by those critical of the doc-
trine of punitive damages, this judicial protest illustrates the
age and tone of the debate about punitive damages in the
United States.2 The debate is old, long on passion and hyper-
bole, and short on reason and hard evidence.
As early as 1931, Professor Clarence Morris objected to the
absence of substantiation in the argument against punitive
damages.3 Missing from the debate, he thought, was evidence
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the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation for all our jury verdict research,
and especially Roger Brosnahan of the Minnesota Fellows of the American
Bar Foundation for his encouragement of our work in the area of punitive
damages. We also want to thank Johanna Womack, Mark Nielsen, and Greg
Stuart for their help in the preparation of the manuscript, and Rebecca Wilton
for expert supervision of the data collection. The views expressed in this
Article are those of the authors and not of the American Bar Foundation nor
the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation.
** Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation. B.A. 1972, Illinois
Benedictine College; MA. 1974, Ph.D. 1978, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
*** Assistant Director, American Bar Foundation. BA. 1970, Ohio Uni-
versity;, J.D. 1981, Loyola University of Chicago; MM. 1985, Northwestern
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1. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
2. This debate includes an often cited article that argued that punitive
damages are an unjust absurdity and that "[t]he doctrine is an anachronism
and should be abolished" Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which
Should Be Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEAPCH INSTITUTE, INC., THE CASE
AGAINST PUNUvE DAMAGES 8 (1969). But see Harris, Rereading Punitive
Damages Beyond the PublicPrivate Distintion, 40 AL" L. REv. 1079, 1082-83
(1989) (arguing that traditional criticisms of punitive damages are no longer
valid).
3. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1179
(1931). Morris responded to the claim that it was unjust and unworkable for
the goals underlying the doctrine of punitive damages to be dependent on pri-
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addressing the key challenges to the doctrine: whether defend-
ants were in fact being subjected to verdicts involving "in-
advisably large sums," whether juries were overly susceptible
to plaintiffs' claims for high awards, and whether judges were
unable to control unjust awards.4 Morris argued against abro-
gating punitive damages on the basis of mere suspicions that
are primarily deductive in character.5 Instead, he advocated ex-
amining the "law in action" to determine the social conse-
quences of the doctrine.6 The conclusion of his commentary
lays out in precise fashion the role empirical evidence should
play in the debate about punitive damages:
Once it is agreed that law should be an aggregation of tools for
social purposes, we are faced with the necessity of testing this assump-
tion or advocating the abandonment of the practice of basing liability
on the misconduct of defendants. The former alternative seems the
wiser.... [C]anniness would seem to dictate an examination of law in
action to determine the scope of its usefulness to contemporary soci-
ety, rather than the advocacy of its abrogation on suspicions which
must be primarily deductive.
... [A]ny valid argument against the allowance of punitive dam-
ages must be predicated on inutility - on undesirable results of its
application, rather than on taboos deduced from non-utilitarian
schemes.7
In one important respect, little has changed in the more
than half-century since the publication of Morris's commen-
tary: criticisms of punitive damages continue, yet little system-
atic, empirical evidence exists on the "law in action" with
regard to punitive damages.8 In another respect, however, an
vate individuals who would benefit personally from heavy judgments and
therefore have little interest in what is just or appropriate. Morris said that
"at best, this criticism is based on hypothesis, and its value depends on the
facts." Id-
4. Id.
5. I& at 1206.
6. Id-
7. Ia at 1205-06.
8. There have been only two systemati6 empirical studies of jury awards
of punitive damages. One is a part of the Rand Corporation Institute for Civil
Justice research into jury verdicts in Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco
County, California. See M. PETERSON, S. SAPMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE
DANAGES: EpmicA FINDINGS iii-xi (1987). The other is a part of a series of
projects investigating jury verdicts that are being conducted at the American
Bar Foundation. See S. DANIELS & J. MARTIN, EMPIRICAL PATTEMS IN PUNI-
TIVE DAMAGE CASES: A DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENCE RATES AM AWARDS 1
(American Bar Foundation Working Paper Series No. 8705, 1988); Daniels &
Martin, Jury Verdicts and the 'Crisis' in Civil Justice, 11 JusT. SYS. J. 321,
321-22 (1986) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, Jury Verdicts]; Daniels & Martin,
The Punitive Damage Dilemma in Products Liability Cases: Fact or Fiction,
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important change has occurred that intensifies Morris's con-
cern and makes the absence of systematic empirical informa-
tion on punitive damages a critical issue. Because of the
"insurance crisis" of the mid-1980's and the emergence of the
tort reform movement, the nature of the debate about punitive
damages has changed. No longer is it a legal debate about the.
doctrinal merits of punitive damages. It is now a highly
politicized public policy debate about the alleged negative ef-
fects of punitive damages on American society and the econ-
omy. Reformers cast these effects as a major cause of the
"insurance crisis" and other ills, and target the doctrine for
substantial change, if not outright abolition.9
Contemporary critics of punitive damages confidently
(pts. 1 & 2), PRODUCTS LIABILITY: COMMENTARY & CASES, Aug. 1986, at 14,
Sept. 1986, at 14; Daniels, Punitive Damages: The Real Stry, A.BA. J., Aug.
1986, at 60.
9. See Johnston, Punitive Liality: A New Paradigm of Ffficiency in
Tort Law, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 1385, 1388 (1987). Johnston notes that-
Virtually no aspect of current tort doctrine has been immune to
criticism and legislative reform. However, attention has been focused
on spectacular punitive damages cases. Despite empirical evidence
suggesting that any increase in the size or frequency of punitive dam-
ages has been limited to a few geographical areas, large punitive dam-
ages awards have come to symbolize the problems perceived in the
current system. Many recently enacted tort reform measures se-
verely limit punitive damages.
IX at 1387-88 (footnotes omitted).
According to Robert Prentice:
The attack on punitive damages is part of a wide-ranging, well-
organized attack on the current tort law system. Claims of a 'itiga-
tion explosion" and an "insurance crisis" have supported a nation-
wide tort reform movement. No doubt there is some substance to
these claims, though the reports of a litigation explosion, like Mark
Twain's death, have been greatly exaggerated and the insurance crisis
is, at least in part, an invention of the insurance industry. There is
also substantial evidence that the claims of runaway punitive damages
are greatly exaggerated.
Prentice, Reorming Punitive Damag" The Judicial Bargaining Concept, 7
REV. OF LITIGATION 113, 123 (1988). See also R. HAYDEN, THE CULTURAL
LOGIC OF A POLrICAL CRISIS: COMMON SENSE, HEGEMONY AND THE GREAT
AMRUCAN LIABIaTY INSURANCE FAMINE OF 1986 at 2-3 (Institute for Legal
Studies Working Paper Series No. 9,1989) (arguing that the tort reform move-
ment was an attempt to divert political attention from the crisis caused by in-
surance companies); Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the
Politics of Civil Justice or" Symbol4 Rhetoric and Agenda-Building, 52
LAw & CONTEbm. PRoas. 269, 269-73 (1989) (arguing that the criticism of juries
is part of a comprehensive attack on the civil justice system as a whole); Hay-
den, Neocontract Polemics and Unconscionable Schozarship, 23 LAW & Soc-
EIY 863, 863-64 (1989) (reviewing P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988) (arguingthat the book fails to sup-
port the position that there is in fact a liability crisis)).
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claim that the doctrine has specific and demonstrable negative
effects reaching crisis proportions.' o Four straightforward, em-
pirical propositions underlie these claims: punitive damages are
routinely awarded; they are awarded in large amounts; the fre-
quency and size of those awards have been rapidly increasing;
and these phenomena are national in scope.' The critics'
claims about the incidence, size, and effects of punitive damages
have reached mythic proportions because the accuracy of these
propositions has not been critically evaluated.12
The four propositions are based on scanty empirical data
and highly questionable interpretations of those data.'3 They
nonetheless provide the tort reform movement with the impe-
tus for vigorous legislative challenges to the doctrine of puni-
10. E.g., Mahoney & Littlejohn, Innovation on TraL Punitive Damages
Versus New Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395, 1395-96 (1989); P. HUBER, LIABLTY:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3-10 (1988).
11. For instance, the amicus brief prepared by a number of major tort re-
form groups in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989),
stay granted, 110 S. Ct. 710, cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 1780 (1990) (No. 89-1279),
claims that:
Punitive damages are today awarded with a frequency and in
amounts that are startling.... And these awards may be enormous:
punitive verdicts exceeding $1 million, while certainly not the norm,
have become almost commonplace....
This system of punitive damages - where punitive awards are
routine and fantastic verdicts receive little attention - is entirely a
product of the last 20 years.
Brief of the American Institute of Architects, the American Tort Reform As-
sociation, the Council of Community Blood Centers, General Electric Com-
pany, the Minnesota Civil Justice Coalition, the National School Boards
Association and the Texas Civil Justice League as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 4, Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, No. 89-1279 (U.S. 1990)
[hereinafter Brief of the American Institute of Architects] (argued Oct. 3,
1990). For an extended discussion of the politics of tort reform, see Daniels,
supra note 9.
12. Some claims about punitive damages may be dismissed as the exagger-
ation and posturing of political debate. E.g., Mahoney, Consumers, Competi-
tiveness Suffer from Ezcesses in Punitive Damages, FINANCIER, Jan. 1989, at
20. But the law review literature has at times indulged in similar excesses.
Even in this literature are found claims - stated as empirical generalizations
- that punitive damages are awarded routinely and in extremely high, if not
staggering amounts. For instance, in a widely cited article, Sales and Coles
boldly claim that "the amount of punitive damages awarded in recent years, as
if feeding upon itself, has escalated to astronomical figures that boggle the
mind." Sales & Coles, Punitive Damages. A Relic That Has Outlived Its Ori-
gins, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1154 (1984). See also Brief of the American Insti-
tute of Architects, supra note 11, at 4, 17, 21-23.
13. See Brief of the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice as Amicus Curiae in
support of Respondents at 7-12, Paciw Mutual (No. 89-129).
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rive damages on both the state and federal levels. 4  In
addition, these allegations have generated numerous constitu-
tional challenges, and the Supreme Court has indicated its
willingness to address the issue. The Court recently rejected
an eighth amendment excessive fines challenge to punitive
damages in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal
Co. 5 In that case, the Court did not address the issue of
whether punitive awards would survive a fourteenth amend-
ment due process contest, although some members of the Court
expressly invited such a contest.;6 This invitation was noticed 7
and the Court agreed subsequently to hear a due process chal-
lenge to punitive damages in Pacifw Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Haslip.;8
14. The American Tort Reform Association recently noted that 27 states
had passed some form of legislation affecting punitive damages in the 1986-89
period. American Tort Reform Association, Legislative Reform in the Puni-
tive Damages Area (1986-1989), Punitive Damages Update, at 1-3 (Nov. 9,1989)
[hereinafter Legislative Reform] (Punitive Damages Update, 2201 Wisconsin
Ave., N.W., Suite 240, Washington, D.C. 20007).
15. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
16. Justice O'Connor, in her opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part6 states that "awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing." Id- at 2924.
In her concurring opinion in Bankers Life v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988), Jus-
tice O'Connor states that a situation when state law gives juries the discretion
to award any amount of punitive damages in any tort casp in which a defend-
ant acts with a certain state of mind may violate the due process clause: "This
grant of wholly standardless discretion to determine the severity of punish-
ment appears inconsistent with due process." I. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Similar sentiments are found in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
in Brouing-Ferris, an opinion with which Justice Marshall joined. 109 S. Ct.
at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. See Brostoff, Supreme Court Okays Punitive Damage Awards, NATL
UNDERWm'rEP, July 3, 1989 at 1, 6. In its July 17, 1989 issue, National Under-
writer ran an editorial expressing regret over the Court's decision in Brown-
ing-Ferris with regard to the eighth amendment issue, describing it as "a
temporary setback for the business community." The High Court's Open Door,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July 17, 1989, at 22. The editorial nonetheless praised
the Court because the decision "cleared a neat path for a conclusive decision
on the Constitutional fairness of unconstrained punitive assessments sometime
in the future." IXL It concluded with the following paragraph:
The battle for constraints on punitive damage awards is far from
finished, for where Browning-Ferris did not succeed, others are wait-
ing in the wings to try again, with a much better idea, this time, of
how to approach the Court: by raising a "due process" argument
early in the proceedings, and preserving that argument throughout
the trial and appeals process.
Id.
18. 553 So.2d 537 (Ala. 1989), stay granted, 110 S. Ct. 710, cer, granted, 110
S. Ct. 1780 (1990); see also Greenhouse, Court to Decide Damage Award Issue,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1990, § A, at 18, col. 4 (discussing decision to grant
certiorari).
19o0]
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It is appropriate, then, to return to Professor Morris's half-
century old concern about the "law in action" with regard to
the frequency and size of punitive damage awards. This Article
presents the findings of an empirical study of punitive damage
awards in state trial courts of general jurisdiction. We present
our findings as an evaluation of the veracity of the four proposi-
tions about the frequency, size, and scope of punitive damages
underlying the reform effort. Accompanying this evaluation is
a more general commentary on the transformation of the puni-
tive damages debate from a legal debate about doctrinal merits
to a highly politicized public policy debate and its implications
for the efficacy of proposed reforms. The commentary goes be-
yond the issue of punitive damages and raises concerns about
the public policy process with regard to civil justice generally.
Part I of this Article presents a brief overview of the tradi-
tional legal debate concerning punitive damages and argues
that in recent years the debate has changed in important ways.
Part II provides a cross-sectional analysis of punitive damage
verdicts in forty-seven counties in eleven states for the period
1981-85. It explores the veracity of three of the propositions
underlying the current challenges to the doctrine of punitive
damages: that they are awarded routinely, that they are
awarded in large amounts, and that these trends are national
in scope. The final section, Part I, addresses the fourth propo-
sition concerning increases in the frequency and size of awards
by examining patterns and changes in punitive damage jury
verdicts in two counties for the period 1970-88.
I. BACKROUND AND CRITICISMS OF THE DOCTRINE
A. THE DOCTRiNAL DEBATE
As Morris's article implies, the punitive damages debate
has been waged in the doctrinal literature for a long time. This
debate addresses two issues: whether the purposes of the doc-
trine are appropriate, and whether they are being met. This
Article does not evaluate the arguments advanced on either
side of the doctrinal debate, but rather addresses them as a
background for a discussion of the policy debate that provides
the impetus for the massive tort reform efforts of the 1980's.
An examination of the purposes of punitive damages begins
with a recognition of the doctrine's substantial history. Its com-
mon law origins generally are traced to two 1793 English cases
arising from the same underlying cause of action. In Wilkes v.
[Vol. 75:1
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Wood 9 and Huckke v. Money,2° appellate courts upheld jury
awards of damages in excess of actual damages.2' These cases
established a form of monetary civil punishment, not necessar-
ily proportional to the actual injury, to fulfill a sense of outrage
resulting from affronts to the honor of an individual.
Punitive damages have a history of almost equal duration
in the United States. Coryell v. CoZbaugh,s2 an action for
breach of promise to marry decided in 1791, is one of the earli-
est cases that refers to punitive damages. The court instructed
the jury "not to estimate the damages by any particular proof
of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for exzmpzels
sake, to prevent such offences in [the] future."'2s The court
stated that "such a sum... would mark [the jury's] disapproba-
tion, and be an example to others." 24
Today, an award of punitive damages is predicated on be-
havior by the defendant that can be characterized as malicious,
willful, wanton, oppressive, or outrageous. State statutory pro-
visions generally emphasize the punishment or deterrence ra-
tionales, or both, for punitive damages. Dorsey Ellis, one of the
doctrine's leading academic commentators, identifies seven
objectives for punitive damages that he gleans from judicial
opinions and related commentary:
1. punishment of the defendant;
2. specific deterrence, to prevent the defendant from re-
peating the offense;
3. general deterrence, to prevent others from committing
similar offenses;
4. preservation of the peace;
5. inducement for private law enforcement;
6. compensation to victims for otherwise uncompensable
losses;
7. payment of the plaintiff's attorney's fees.25
The propriety of such objectives and their efficacy is often
severely criticized. The punishment rationale, for example, is
criticized for duplicating criminal punishment without the pro-
19. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
20. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (KB. 1763).
21. See Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99; Huc e, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769.
22. 1 N.J.L. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1791).
23. 1& at 91 (emphasis in original).
24. I&
25. E lis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1982).
1990)
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cedural safeguards of criminal law.s The burden of proof in
the civil system, proof by a preponderance of the evidence, is
less rigorous than that required by criminal law, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 7 Other procedural safeguards inherent in
criminal procedure, but not in civil procedure, include the right
to counsel and the role and size of juries. Those who find the
procedures for assessing punitive damages inadequate argue
that juries are not equipped to assess appropriate damages after
hearing evidence on the defendant's wealth and motives. These
critics assert that juries are overly affected by the presence of
an injured plaintiff.8
Critics also argue that deterrence is an inadequate ration-
ale for the imposition of punitive damages. Some opponents be-
lieve that there is insufficient evidence to prove that deterrence
is actually accomplished.29 Others believe that jurisdictions us-
ing this rationale fail to clarify the entities sought to be de-
terred-s Another concern is that even if deterrence is a
legitimate goal, the individual plaintiff is not the appropriate
recipient of what becomes a windfall award.3' Additionally,
the prospect of punitive damages might prompt a "race to the
courthouse" in which those plaintiffs arriving first deplete the
funds available to compensate all wronged parties.32 To resolve
these and similar problems, the doctrine's critics propose the
use of caps on awards and ratios of punitive damages to com-
pensatory damagesPss The most radical of the critics argue for
the abolition of punitive damages altogether.34
Proponents of punitive damage awards defend against such
criticisms in several ways. They rebut the argument that pun-
ishment is an inappropriate purpose for a civil remedy by rea-
soning that not all outrageous conduct is criminal in nature,
26. E.g., Ellis, Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 975, 991-99 (1989). See also Peters, Punitive Damages in Oregon, 18 WIL-
LAmErE L. REV. 369, 406-11 (1982) (arguing for the abolition of punitive dam-
ages except as specifically provided by statute to "promote clarity of the law
and fairness in its administration"); Brief of Association for California Tort
Reform as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at 2-3, Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, No. 89-1279 (U.S. 1990) (argued Oct. 3.1990) (arguing that unlim-
ited punitive damages are per se a violation of due process).
27. Ellis, supra note 26, at 991-99; Peters, supr note 26, at 407.
28. Ellis, supra note 26, at 996-99.
29. Peters, supra note 26, at 420-23.
30. Sales & Coles, supra note 12, at 1158-64.
31. Id- at 1165.
32. Ad at 1159-64.
33. Id. at 1168-69.
34. Id. at 1154-58.
[Vol. 75:1
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maling civil remedies necessary and appropriate.3 Proponents
address the critics' procedural concerns with examples of in-
creasing numbers of jurisdictions that have adopted a "dear
and convincing" standard of proof rather than the preponder-
ance standard s 6 Some also argue that a burden of proof lower
than the criminal standard is appropriate in cases where the de-
fendant has a comparative advantage in access to evidence, such
as those involving medical malpractice and products liability.s7
Additionally, proponents argue that trial court control and ap-
pellate review are adequate safeguards against potential jury
abuse. They also point to the lack of systematic empirical evi-
dence that juries are excessively plaintiff-oriented.
Proponents of punitive damages also defend the deterrence
rationale. Much of this rationale's criticism presumes that pu-
nitive awards are made in excessive amounts, suggesting not
deterrence but overkill. The proponents counter that no sys.
tematic evidence exists to support opponents' claims about ex-
cessive awards. Thus, without such evidence, allegations that
juries are incapable of fairly considering the character of the
defendant's misconduct, the extent of the plaintiff's injury, and
the wealth of the defendant to determine an appropriate award
are mere speculation. Moreover, proponents of the doctrine ar-
gue that placing caps on awards or imposing ratios of punitive-
to-compensatory awards would take away the threat of high
damages necessary for effective deterrence?38
Commentators have debated the appropriateness of the de-
terrence and punishment rationales for a long time. During the
past decade, however, the traditional arguments have been rad-
ically transformed as the debate has moved into the political
arena. The next section describes this transformation and its
implications.
B. THE PouIZATIoN oF PuNrIVE DAAGES
1. Transformation of the Punitive Damages Debate
To politicize an issue, according to political scientist Mur-
ray Edelman, is to define it for both the mass public and
35. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a P7inciledApproach,
31 HASTINGS L. J. 639, 644-47 (1980).
36. According to the American Tort Reform Association, 18 states had
adopted the "dear and convincing" standard between 1986 and 1988. Legisla-
tive Reform, supra note 14, at 2.
37. Johnston, suira note 9, at 1403-04.
38. I& at 1406.
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policymakers as being an appropriate issue for public decision-
making. More to the point, it is a way of defining an issue as
requiring immediate public attention in the furtherance of a
particular set of political goals. "Politicization is the creation
of a state of mind," says Edelman. 39 The critical element, in
his view, "is the creation of meaning: the construction of be-
liefs about the significance of events, of problems, of crises, of
policy changes, and of leaders. The strategic need is to immo-
bilize opposition and mobilize support."' 4
The idea of policy problems as social constructions implies
a conception of the policymaking process different than that
found in much academic writing and the statements of public
officials. Rather than being a rational process with responsible
agencies searching for the best way of coping with a problem,
the striking characteristics of the link between political problems and
solutions in everyday life is that the solution typically comes first,
chronologically and psychologically. Those who favor a particular
course of governmental action are likely to cast about for a widely
feared problem to which to attach it in order to maximize its
support 41
This idea of politicization is the key to understanding how and
why the punitive damages debate, like the larger debate about
civil justice, has changed in recent years.
The debate changed in the 1980's as a part of an intense,
well-organized, and well-financed political campaign by interest
groups seeking fundamental reforms in the civil justice system
benefiting themselves.42 Thus, their discussion of the doctrine
is directed toward the creation of a state of mind that says
policymakers must address the issue of punitive damages im-
mediately because substantial reform is necessary. Creating
this state of mind is required for the mobilization of a broad
base of support for the tort reform cause. It is also neccessary
to help forestall the efforts of anti-reformers, such as consumer
and plaintiff-attorney groups, who are fighting the desired
reforms.
To create this state of mind, the reformers characterize the
civil justice system as a system out of control, with punitive
damages a primary cause. The problems for American society
occasioned by this distressed system out of control have
39. M. EDELMAN, POLnTCAL LANGUAGE: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POL-
ICIES THAT FAIL 120 (1977).
40. Edelman, Political Language and Political Reality, 18 PS 10 (1985).
41. M EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE PoLrImCAL SPECTACLE 21-22 (1988).
42. See Daniels, supra note 9, at 273.
Vol. 75:1
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reached crisis proportions, the reformers claim. The effects of
these problems require fundamental change in the doctrine of
punitive damages, if not its outright abolition. Their effort to
produce a broad base of support conducive to reform includes
the establishment of public relations and lobbying organizations
to spearhead the campaign.43 The creation of such groups indi-
cates, more than anything else, how the debate has changed.
The reformers' political agenda is so strong that it even in-
trudes into much of the academic debate concerning punitive
damages."
43. In 1982, for example, a public relations and lobbying campaign called
'"roject Justice" began in Illinois. The product of combined insurance,
business, professional, and service provider interests, "Project Justice, Illi-
nois ... was considered a prototype tort reform coalition." Casey, Tort Reform
Coalition Flourish in Midwest, NATL UNDERWRITER, July 18, 1986, at 14. It
was formed to disseminate information to the public, opinion leaders, and
policymakers, and to coordinate lobbying efforts, all in the interest of civil jus-
tice reform. Ia As the 'Insurance crisis" began making its way onto the pub-
lic agenda in the early 1980's, similar organizations began appearing across the
country. Id. at 54-55.
The following organizations were established in the early to mid-1980's:
Indiana Project Justice, Kansas Project Justice, the Truth and Fairness in Liti-
gation Committee in Pennsylvania, the Liability Reform Coalition in Washing-
ton, Florida Project Civil Justice, the Wisconsin Coalition for Justice, the
Minnesota Tort Reform Coalition, the Ohio Basic Fairness in Litigation Coali-
tion, the Michigan Committee for Civil Justice Equity, Iowa Project Civil Jus-
tice Reform, Nebraska Project Justice, and the Texas Tort Reform Coalition,
which changed its name to the Texas Civil Justice League. See Civil Justice
Coalition- A National Awakening, J. AM. INS., 1st Q., 1986, at 4. Two of these
groups, the Minnesota Tort Reform Coalition and the Texas Civil Justice
League, appear in a major amicus brief in Pacfic Mutual along with the
broader based American Tort Reform Association. See Brief of the American
Institute of Architects, supra note 11, at 1.
44. Legal academics have shown more interest in punitive damages and
tort reform as the "Insurance crisis" has gained more visibility as a public pol-
icy issue. According to Dean Ellis, an influential scholar of punitive damages,
the general sentiment in the law reviews is against punitive damages. Ellis,
supra note 26, at 976. It is worth noting, however, that the reform interests
have been active in drawing attention to their agenda and hopefully affecting
the direction of academic writing through their support of research institu-
tions such as the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice and the
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research in New York City. See RAND CoR o-
RATION, THE INSnTUTE FOR CIvL JUSTICE: AN OvERva W OF THE FIST Six
PROGRAM YEARS 75-78 (1986); RAND CORPORATION, THE INSTITUTE FOR CrvEL
JUSTICE: ANNUAL REPORT, APRIL 1, 1989 - MARCH 31, 1990 108-11 (1989);
ANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH, MANHATrAN FORUMS: THE
FIST FivE YEARS 28 (1986). The Manhattan Institute, along with the Acad-
emy of Political Science, cosponsored an academic conference in November,
1987, entitled "New Directions in Liability Law." According to a conference
brochure, funds for the conference were provided by the Charles A. Dana
Foundation, the Starr Foundation, Aetna, Alliance of American Insurers,
1990]
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This transformation of the debate, especially the efforts of
public relations and lobbying organizations, produces a differ-
ent style of argumentation than was used in the past. This new
approach, which has the single-minded goal of winning a major
political battle, is the most troubling aspect of the politicization
of the punitive damages debate. It makes the debate more emo-
tional and manipulative, and less reasoned. The reformers ap-
peal to emotions, fear, and anxiety in this political effort while
avoiding reason and rational discourse.'4 Not even the aca-
demic literature is immune to such appeals.'
In many respects, the transformed debate is similar to the
handling of other recent political campaigns, such as the Bush
presidential campaign's use of the 'Willie Horton issue" during
the 1988 election. This issue was a blatant appeal to fear and
anxiety, suggesting that a Dukakis victory would lead to the
wholesale release from prison of convicted murderers.' 7 The
transformed debate is also similar to a recent trend in market-
ing known as "slice-of-death" marketing.48  The message of
slice-of-death marketing is sheer anxiety, and it seeks to create
a fear that only a particular consumer product or service can
alleviate.49
Appeals of this kind in the political arena involve the use
of a public rhetoric that is described as the "tactical use of pas-
American Hoist and Derrick, AT&T, Dow Chemical, General Dynamics, Pru-
dential, RJR Nabisco, Sea-Land Corporation, and Weyerhaeuser. In addition
to these founders, the conference was also given financial support by the
Broyhill foundation, the Louisberg foundation, the Monsato Fund, the Moses
Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Sunmark Foundation.
See New Directions in Liability Law, AcAD. POL. Sot. PROC., vol. 37, No. 1
1988, at iv. A similar conference, the Brookings Civil Liability Conference,
was held in June, 1987 at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. It was
funded in part by the A.V. Starr Foundation, Dow Chemical Company, Bell
Atlantic, the Alex C. Walker Foundation, and the Aetna Foundation. See
MacLaury, Foreward to R. LrrAN & C. WINSTON, LILA 'T=rY: PEPrarzVE
AND POLICY at viii (1988). On the relationship between conservative founda-
tions on the one hand, and think tanks and political discourse on the other, see
Wright, The Foundation Game, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 5, 1990, at 24-25.
45. See Daniels, suprna note 9, at 276.
46. See Dean Ellis's observations on juries in a recent symposium on puni-
tive damages. Ellis, supra note 26, at 988-1003. See also P. HUBEI, supra note
10, at 4 (listing "good" activities, such as high school sports, that have been
closed down by tort crisis).
47. See generally Estrich, The Politics of Race, Wash. Post., Apr. 23, 1989,
§ W (Magazine), at 20 (criticizing use of "Willie Horton" issue by Bush cam-
paign and Dukakis campaign's response).
48. E.g., Lippert, Anxiety for the 90': Slice-of-Death Marketing Values
Come Home From the Office, Chicago Trib., Dec. 22, 1989, § 5, at 2.
49. Ia
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sion."sO It is a style of argument or manner of constructing an
issue that "seeks to eliminate the mind and the critical facul-
ties"5' and instead provokes "feeling rather than thought." 2
The reformers create fear and anxiety by characterizing the
civil justice system as one in crisis, presenting dire threats to
personal and national well-being. Fundamental change in the
punitive damages system, they argue, is the only way to end the
crisis and ensure security. In short, the punitive damages de-
bate has become a matter of public relations, propaganda, and
the mobilization of prejudice and fear, rather than a matter of
rational discourseSS
The transformation of this debate is troubling because the
efficacy of any reforms enacted depends on the questionable
nature of the underlying assumptions about the operation and
effects of the punitive damages system.54 The reformers have a
ready-made set of solutions that benefit them. To achieve these
goals, they must create a belief in a set of problems demanding
those solutions,5 5 so they posit the existence of severe problems
50. F. BAILEY, THE TACTICAL USES OF PASSION q (1983). See also Dan-
iels, supra note 9, at 276 (describing the strategic use of emotional appeals in
civil jury reform efforts).
5L F. BAmE, supa note 50, at 26.
52. I
53. Edelman suggests that:
[Plersonified threats are politically potent regardless of the serious-
ness or triviality of their impact upon people's lives. The personified
threat, no matter how atypical, marshalls public support for controls
over a much larger number of ambiguous cases symbolically con-
densed into the threatening stereotype.
AL EDELmAN, supra note 39, at 14.
54. Edelman notes that "[p]olitical and ideological debate consists very
largely of efforts to win acceptance of a particular categorization of an issue in
the face of competing efforts in behalf of a different one." d. at 25. Such ef-
forts may involve a substantial investment in public relations and widespread
publicity. See Daniels, supra note 9, at 281-92. More troubling, Edelman also
says that "[a] large body of empirical and theoretical work demonstrates that
the impact of the most widely publicized formal governmental policies is con-
sistently small or symbolic especially when both proponents and opponents
expect the policies in question to mark a substantial change." Id at 126. See
generally K FE=, COURT REFORm ON TRIAL: WHY SuIMPL SOLUTIONS FAIL
191-207 (1983) (describing systemic and institutional impediments to court
reforms).
55. Cobb and Elder note that:
Just as problems may be officially ignored for want of a solution, the
emergence of a solution may make possible the recognition of a public
policy problem. We normally think of policy problems" as having
their own origins in events and circumstances. These create difficul-
ties, which, in turn, prompt a search for solutions. Often, however,
this is not the case... The impetus then for the definition (or redefi-
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caused by the frequency and size of punitive damage awards.
To the extent that the reformers are successful in creating
their desired characterization, the resulting policy changes are
likely to be wholly ineffective in meeting the expectations cre-
ated for those persuaded to support the reform agenda. Accu-
racy, in fact, may be largely irrelevant to the reformers'
purposes of placing reforms on the policy agenda and enacting
those reforms. As Edelman emphasizes, "public policies rest on
the beliefs and perceptions of those who help make them,
whether or not those cognitions are accurate."55s The danger is
that the rhetoric used to justify and gain support for the reform
agenda can create misleading beliefs about the existence,
causes, and nature of problems. This, then, undermines the ef-
ficacy of public policies based on those beliefs, which requires a
reasonably accurate picture of the punitive damages system.57
2. The Reformers' Evidence in the Debate
Proponents of change generally use two types of evidence
to support their characterization of the punitive damages sys-
tem: horror stories and anecdotes about jury verdicts involving
punitive damages, and aggregate data on the frequency and size
of these awards. They present such evidence to convince the
public and policymakers of the veracity of four propositions:
1. punitive damages are routinely awarded;
2. punitive damages are routinely awarded in large
amounts;
3. the frequency and size of these awards are rapidly in-
creasing, and,
4. propositions 1, 2, and 3 are national in scope.
All other claims about the harmful effects of punitive damages
presume the accuracy of these propositions. The presumption
is that if these propositions accurately describe the punitive
damages system, all of the alleged harmful effects automati-
cally and necessarily occur. Accordingly, the major thrust of
the reform agenda is the elimination of punitive damages. In
nition) of a situation as a problem may come from the availability of a
solution just waiting, if not actively searching, for a problem to 'solve.'
R. COBB & C. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AEICAN POLTICs: THE DYNAMICS
OF AGENDA BUIuDrG 177 (2d ed. 1983).
56. M. EDELMAN, supm note 39, at 9.
57. Edelman states: "Because public policies and rhetoric can create mis-
leading beliefs about the causes and the nature of these problems, they also
ensure that the problems will not be dealt with as effectively as they might
be." I& at 28.
[Vol. 7/5:1
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
the alternative, the reformers recommend a severe limitation
on the availability of punitive damage awards, and the imposi-
tion of caps when such awards occur. Increasingly, the reform-
ers are attempting to institute these changes on a national
level.5s
A series of materials assembled by a Washington, D.C.,
public relations firm, 59 and frequently distributed to editors of
a variety of publications, provides examples of the use of these
two types of evidence. These materials are an excellent illus-
tration of the style of argumentation that now characterizes the
punitive damages debate. Titled Punitive Damages Udate, the
materials are assembled as a "service of a number of corpora-
tions and organizations supporting tort reform."60 Among the
most interesting of the materials is a "press kit," dated April
58. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supmr note 10, at 1897-98.
59. The Pellerin Group Public Relations, Inc., 2201 Wisconsin Avenue,
N.W., Suite 240, Washington, DC 20007.
60. American Tort Reform Association, Punitive Damages Update, Cover
Letter at 1 (Apr. 12, 1989) [hereinafter Cover Letter]. Other mailings have in-
cluded a November 6, 1989, missive presenting an American Tort Reform As-
sociation (ATRA) report on legislative changes in the punitive damages area
along with a reprint of Goldberg, Punitives in Peril, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1989, at 46.
See Legislative Reform, supra note 14, at 4. The article was touted as featur-
ing comments from ATRA's president and other tort reform experts. Another
mailing announced that the United States Supreme Court had granted a stay
of a state court judgment in an Alabama punitive damages case pending a
timely filing of a writ of certiorari. American Tort Reform Association, Puni-
tive Damages Update, Supreme Court Grants Stay in Alabama Punitive Case
(Nov. 7, 1989). The case involves fraud, and the Employment Retirement In-
come Security Act, an award of $2,412 in compensatory damages, and an award
of $1,797,588 in punitive damages. HealthAmerica v. Menton, 551 So. 2d 235
(AIa), cert denied, 110 S. Ct 1166 (1989). Other mailings by ATRA include
Punitive Damages Update, Ten Punitive Damages Petitions for Certiorari
Before United States Supreme Court (Oct. 12,1989) (summary of the issues in-
volving punitive damages awaiting the Supreme Court as it began the 1989
term); Punitive Damages Update, Five Punitive Damages Petitions for Certio-
rari Pending Before United States Supreme Court -(Jan. 29, 1990); Punitive
Damages Update, Pennsylvania Bar Association Recommends Reform of State
Punitive Damages Law (Aug. 16,1990) (explaining that a package of 22 recom-
mendations for reforming the Pennsylvania tort system was adopted by the
Commonwealth's bar association); Punitive Damages Update, California Puni-
tive Damages Awards Increase 266 Percent Since 1987 (Dec. 28, 1989) [herein-
after California Punitive Damages] (reporting on a study by the Association
for California Tort Reform on the increase in the size of punitive damage
awards); Punitive Damages Update, Legal Uncertainty Forces Beneficial Prod-
ucts Off the Market (Dec. 15, 1989) [hereinafter Legal Uncertainty] (touting
Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10); Punitive Damages Update, Legal Ex-
pert Calls for Curbing Abuses of Punitive Damages Awards (July 31, 1989)
(presenting the highlights of Peter Huber's speech before the National Gover-
nor's Association annual meeting in Chicago).
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12, 1989,61 and mailed to targeted journalists the week prior to
oral arguments before the Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris
Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal Co..62
The press kit utilizes both horror stories and aggregate
data to characterize the punitive damages system as one so seri-
ously flawed and threatening as to require fundamental change.
Under the guise of presenting background information for
those journalists reporting on Browning-Ferris, it communi-
cates the basic claims that underlie the reformers' characteriza-
tion: punitive damages are awarded routinely and with
increasing frequency, in a wider variety of cases, in larger and
larger amounts, and without any apparent pattern. The im-
age presented is a disturbing one of a system out of control. As
a result of this situation, the press kit states, many goods and
services are becoming more expensive or even unavailable.
Most seriously, this includes essential services and goods, such
61. Cover Letter, supra note 60, at 1. The first three paragraphs of the
cover letter read:
Dear Editor/Correspondent-
On April 18 the U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on
Browning-Ferris Industnies, Inc. v. KeZko Dzsposa4 Inc. The Court
will review a Vermont jury's award of $51,000 in compensatory dam-
ages and $6 million in punitive damages.
For the first time the Court will directly examine the question of
whether disproportionately large punitive damage awards are in viola-
tion of the Excessive Fines clause of the 8th Amendment to the Con-
stitution.
Because you might be considering coverage of the oral arguments
and/or the decision expected later this year, we have put together a
number of background materials for your unrestricted use. These
materials include:
- An overview of the case;
- An overview of punitive damages in general;
- A list of qualified experts who have agreed to interviews on
the case;
- A press release on the case from the Lawyers for Civil
Justice;
- Relevant studies on punitive damages;
- Quotations from Supreme Court Justices on the issue;
- An article on a recent ruling by a New Jersey judge on mass
tort cases;
- A list of states enacting punitive damage legislation since
1986;
- A press release on testimony in Minnesota on punitive
damages;
- A press release on punitive damages legislation that passed in
Utah; and
- Relevant news clippings.
Id.
62. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989), ff'g, 845 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 198B).
63. Cover Letter, supra note 60, at 6.
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as medical services and vaccines. Additionally, research and
development in American industry are being halted or discour-
aged, thereby making American businesses less competitive in
the international market and threatening jobs. Consequently,
the press kit says, the punitive damages problem is a direct
threat to economic stabilityPs This characterization of a system
out of control is at the very heart of the "slice-of-death" appeal
to fear and anxiety, and fundamental civil justice reform ap-
pears to be the only method to alleviate those feelings.
Among the materials the press kit uses to substantiate such
claims are two commentaries written by Richard J. Mahoney,
chairman and chief executive officer of Monsanto.66 Both rely
prominently on horror stories, as does a third Mahoney com-
mentary, co-authored with Stephen E. Littlejohn, the Public
Affairs Director for Monsanto, that appears in a late 1989 issue
of Science.6 This third piece is touted in a December 15, 1989
press release mailed by Punitive Damages Update. s Maho-
ney's three essays are similar, but each is directed to a different
audience.69 Mahoney seeks to justify reform and garner sup-
port for the cause by generating fear and anxiety about reduced
or curtailed innovation, research and development in American
industry. Mahoney links reduced or curtailed research and de-
velopment to the availability of essential health care services
and technologies, to economic stability and prosperity, and in
the Science article, to the professional well-being of scientific
and technical professionals.Y9 Punitive damages, according to
the Science article, "constitute the driving force behind this
problem, and both judges and legislators should aim at bringing
them under control with legal reforms."7' The Mahoney pieces
are worth examining in detail because they illustrate the
politicization of the punitive damages debate and provide the
64. Cover Letter, supra note 60, at 4.
65. Id See also Mahoney, supra note 12, at 23 (arguing that U.S. advan-
tage in aircraft production is eroding); Mahoney, Punitive Damages: The
Courts are Curbing Creativity, N. Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1988, § 3, at 3 [hereinafter
Mahoney, Punitive Damages] (arguing punitive damages affect United States'
international competitiveness).
66. Mahoney, supra note 12; Mahoney, Punitive Damages, supra note 65.
67. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1395.
68. Legal Uncertainty, supra note 60, at 1.
69. Mahoney, Punitive Damages, supra note 65 (general readership); Ma-
honey, supra note 12 (business and financial audience); Mahoney & Little-john, supra note 10 (intellectual and scientific audience).
70. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1397; Mahoney, supa note
12, at 22; Mahoney, Punitive Damages, supra note 65, at 3.
71. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1395.
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most sophisticated and persuasive examples of the reformers'
efforts at characterization. This examination emphasizes Ma-
honey and Littlejohn's article because Science, arguably the
most prestigious American scientific journal, gives their argu-
ments substantial credibility and force.
To illustrate the negative effects of punitive damages, Ma-
honey tells horror stories, including one involving his own
company. Monsanto, he says, cancelled a program to develop
an asbestos substitute because of the threat of punitive dam-
ages. The Monsanto employee directing the ill-fated project is
quoted as saying that "seven-figure jury awards on claims with-
out merit are enough to send shivers down anyone's spine."72
Mahoney also complains repeatedly of a civil justice system
that "makes it too easy for lawyers to persuade the jury... to
enrich plaintiffs and contingent fee lawyers with multi-million-
dollar windfalls."73 He refers to a "statistically proven relation-
ship between the punitive damages award and the relative
wealth and unpopularity of the defendant."7 4 Such damages, he
argues, "were... virtually unknown" in the past but are now
"almost commonplace with multi-million dollar awards occur-
ring monthly.3
7 5
72. Id
73. Mahoney, Punitive Dwnages, supra note 65, at 3. Nearly the 'same
words appear in Mahoney & Littlejohn, sup note 10, at 1396, and in Maho-
ney, supm note 12, at 21.
74. Mahoney, supm note 12, at 21. One finds Dean Ellis making the same
claim in a recent symposium article on punitive damages. Ellis, suprm note 26,
at 988-1003. In a burst of excess and invective, Ellis says:
Jury bias in favor of an injured plaintiff and against the defendant is a
major concern for the defendant against whom punitive damages are
sought. This is especially true for institutional defendants. Profit-
making entities, such as insurance companies, banking institutions,
and manufacturing corporations, do not rank high in the public's es-
teem, even when a cross-section of the community is systematically
surveyed. And, regardless of our aspirations, juries do not reflect a
cross-section of the community. Noticeably absent from most panels
are those who are most likely to understand the fuLictions of profits in
an enterprise economy - managers and professionals. Hence, the an-
tagonism toward large, profit-making institutions is likely to be
greater in a cross-section of jurors than in a cross-section of the com-
munity. There is good reason to believe, moreover, that this bias will
manifest itself in the jury's decision on the defendant's liability for
punitive damages ....
Id. at 996-97. Such sloppy reasoning and shallow analysis could be simply dis-
missed out-of-hand if it were not written by a major legal scholar in this area.
75. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1396; Mahoney, supra note
12, at 20.
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Two of the three Mahoney articles present the following
stories about actual punitive damage cases:
After the longest running trial in America's history, a jury in Belle-
vile, i., last year awarded one dollar to each of 65 plaintiffs as nomi-
nal damages for alleged personal injuries in a case involving one of
my company's products - orthochIorophenol crude - which is used
to make wood preservatives. Then, in a burst of tortured reasoning,
the jury awarded $16 million in punitive damages to the plaintiffs.
More recently, Monsanto's G.D. Searle subsidiary was assessed $7
million in punitive damages in a St. Paul, Minn., case involving the
Copper 7 intrauterine device that not only has Food and Drug Admin-
istration approval, but also a long history of safe use and substantial
medical acclaim.' 6
The Science article, aimed at an audience more interested
in research and development, presents a third story as repre-
sentative of jury awards of punitive damages:
One case exemplifies the problem with punitive damages. Lederle
Laboratories, a pharmaceutical company, followed Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) instructions to the letter in producing and mar-
keting a polio vaccine, only to have a Kansas jury hand down an $8
million punitive damage verdict against it. The reason: The lay jury
decided that the firm should have used a less effective vaccine, essen-
tially overruling FDA doctors, scientists, and policy-makers who had
told the firm to do otherwise.77
76. Mahoney, Punitive Damages, supra note 65, at 3. The same stories ap-
peared in Mahoney, supra note 12, at 20. There is, however, reason to be quite
skeptical of Mahoney's protestations of innocence - at least in terms of the
Minnesota Copper-7 judgment he rails against. It was a trial in which numer-
ous internal Searle documents were introduced into evidence. These materials
showed that the company had been aware of problems with the Copper-7 for
many years (problems with a higher incidence of pelvic infections that can
lead to sterility in a clearly identifiable group of women) and that manage-
ment ultimately decided not to make changes in the product for the American
market. See Mintz The Selling of an IUD: Behind the Scenes at G.D. Searle
During the Rise and Fall of the Copper-7, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1988, Health §,
at 12, col. 1. In fact, the company's public posture was to deny any link be-
tween the Copper-? and pelvic infections despite evidence to the contrary. Id
These Searle documents also raised questions about the quality of the com-
pany's own research involving the testing of the device with regard to pelvic
infections. See Judge Denies Searle Bid for New IUD Liability Tral, Chi.
Trib., Feb. 17, 1989, § C, at 3; Claimant in Searle UD Liability Case Seeks $15
Million in Punitive Damages, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1988, at 9, col. 1; Mintz,
supra, at 12, col. 1; Contraceptive Trial Opens with Charges Monsanto Knew of
Copper-7 Defects, Wall St. J., May 18,1988, at 6, col. 2; Records Raise Question.
Did Monsanto Know of IUD Problem in Buying Searle? Wall St. J., Mar. 15,
1988, at 9, col. 2; see also Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517,
1526 (D. Minn. 1989) (denying G.D. Searle's motion for a new trial becausejury could have concluded reasonably that Searle intentionally misrepresented
the safety of the Cu-7).
77. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1396.
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This story is immediately preceded in the article by the presen-
tation of "hard data" presumably intended to show that large,
even multi-million dollar, punitive damage awards are routine.
In Cook County, Illinois, according to Mahoney and Littlejohn,
the average punitive damage award in personal injury actions
from 1980 to 1984 was $1,934,000 s13
Once the punitive damages problem is "proven," the essays
then describe the alleged adverse effects that punitive damages
have on health care and economic well-being- there is "a
profound negative impact on the development and utilization of
potentially life-saving medical technologies."7 9 Pharmaceuti-
cals have been severely affected. According to the Science arti-
cle, the American Medical Association has concluded that basic
biomedical research is deteriorating and small companies are
delaying or foregoing innovative product releases80 Similarly,
the National Academy of Sciences has allegedly found that be-
cause of the high cost of vaccine-related injuries, many manu-
facturers may not "pursue the derivation or distribution of a
vaccine to prevent AIDS."8' Furthermore, the article cites an-
other medical authority for stating that the United States is
now losing its leadership role in the area of contraceptive tech-
nology.8 2 Thus, it would appear that punitive damages are a
threat to public health and necessary medical care.83
The alleged adverse impact also extends to the country's
economic well-being. Mahoney says that the cases he recounts
are "kmown only too well by major American companies, cost-
78. Id. A "study" conducted by the Association for California Tort Re-
form "informs" us that the average punitive damage award in California rose
from $1.69 million in 1987 to $3.01 million in 1989. California Punitive Dam-
ages, supnz note 60, at 1.
79. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1397.
80. Id; Mahoney, supm note 12, at 22.
81. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 22; Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10,
at 1397.
82. Mahoney & Littlejohn, su~pa note 10, at 1897.
83. The parade of horrors continues with an anti-nausea morning sickness
drug being withdrawn from the market even though it was "widely used by
health care professionals and approved by the FDA." Id. Medical equipment
is also at risk. Union Carbide halted development of a suitcase-sized kidney
dialysis machine because of the threat of punitive damages. Id. This company
also stopped offering intravenous equipment. Id. Moreover, the only U.S.
manufacturer of gas anesthesia machines withdrew from the market, leaving
the market to two foreign companies. Id The alleged explosion in punitive
damage awards has also affected foreign suppliers. For instance, "the Japa-
nese maker of a vaccine for Japanese encephalitis withdrew the product from
the U.S. market... because of liability concerns, leaving American travelers
to Asia unprotected." Id-
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ing everybody in lost jobs, new and improved products, and
international competitiveness."'' 4 Indeed, "American manufac-
turers are falling behind in key industries and major product
groups."85 In addition, research laboratories, such as the Law-
rence Livermore Laboratory in California and the University of
Wisconsin at Madison, are allegedly reluctant to transfer dis-
coveries to the marketplace because of liability concerns.P
This claim, no doubt, is intended to show thd readers of Science
that the punitive damage problem is one to which they must
pay attention.
Finally, there is the question of how to characterize the pu-
nitive damages debate itself. For Mahoney, it is a simple mat-
ter of balancing the interests of undeserving plaintiffs and
greedy trial lawyers against the public good. In two of his es-
says he portrays the issue in the following way: 'ho loses
with these reform proposals? Only plaintiff lawyers and their
already compensated clients who have hit the punitive damages
jackpot. But the whole country wins with important gains in
jobs, new and improved products, international competitiveness
- and a fairer legal system for all."87
Mahoney intends to create a state of mind and a characteri-
zation of the situation that leads to one conclusion: "Clearly,
reforms in punitive-damages law are vitally needed by the en-
tire nation."s He claims that our collective well-being depends
on changes in the punitive damage system and that those who
support his reforms will affirm that the nation's future depends
on the continued pursuit of innovative scientific knowledge.
For Mahoney, current punitive damage rules "stifle the for-
ward progress of innovation."8 9
Horror stories in the punitive damages debate, exemplified
by the Mahoney pieces, have great evocative power. They im-
ply that Americans are overly litigious, that juries are willing
to award millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive dam-
ages on a whim, especially in areas such as products liability
and medical malpractice, and that plaintiffs' attorneys abuse
the contigency fee system for their own enrichment. The ap-
84. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 20-21.
85. I at 23.
86. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1397.
87. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 24; Mahoney, Punitive Damages, supra
note 65, at 3.
88. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 23; Mahoney, Punitive Damages, supra
note 65, at 3.
89. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1398.
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proach's evocative power comes from its appeal to latent
prejudices about undeserving plaintiffs and ambulance-chasing
attorneys, and from its generation of anxiety concerning the al-
leged effects of the punitive damage problems, such as the un-
availability of vaccines and life-saving drugs or essential
medical servicesP9 In appealing to such prejudices and anxie-
ties, the horror stories direct attention away from alternative
explanations that may justify large punitive damage awards
and portray defendants as something other than the innocent
victims of greed.91
Reformers present aggregate data on punitive damage ver-
dicts, the second major type of evidence used in the political de-
bate, as more precise and scientific proof of the problem's
scope. Their data provide the broader context that makes the
horror stories so convincing. Such "hard data" are meant to
serve as symbolic benchmarks, much like the figures for mone-
tary losses or deaths after a natural disaster, by which people
will shape their perceptions of punitive damages and the civil
justice system.92 These benchmarks arouse concern, and evoke
a belief that the civil justice system is reaching a crisis stage.93
Mahoney and Littlejohn's use of "hard data" from Cook
90. See I. HAYDEN, supra note 9, at 13-14; Daniels, supra note 9, at 280.
91. See supr note 76 and accompanying text. See also P. BRODEUR, OUT-
RAGEOUS MISCONDUCr THE AsBEsTos INDuSTRY ON TRIAL (1985) (approving
of punitive damage awards for known dangers in asbestos-related litigation).
Edelman provides an apt illustration of the general point about masking alter-
native explanations for events:
Many crises are precipitated by an event that rather suddenly makes
clear the serious consequences of activities that have been going on
for a long time without occasioning much concern. Limitations on re-
fining capacity and long-standing tax and price arrangements among
American oil companies and Middle East oil-producing countries set
the stage for an energy crisis long before the sudden declaration in
1973 that oil was in short supply.
Edelman, supra note 39, at 46-47.
92. See Edelman, suprm note 39, at 29-32.
93. See Daniels, supr note 9, at 309-10; P. HAYDEN, supra note 9, at 21-23.
In fact, a major amicus brief in Paclfc Mutual is premised on this logic:
[I]t is only in recent years that punitive damage awards subject to
challenge as unconstitutionally excessive and arbitrary have been im-
posed upon defendants. From 1789 to 1970, the limited availability
and small magnitude of punitive damage awards gave no serious basis
for anyone to claim protection under the Due Process Clause. In re-
cent years, however, the need for constitutional scrutiny of punitive
damage awards has become increasingly clear.
Brief of the American Institute of Architects, suprm note 11, at 28. The brief's
argument is dominated by the presentation of quantitative data to show the
alleged change. Id. at 23-28.
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County and California is a good illustration.9
The Punitive Darnages Update press kit includes a section
summarizing the findings of a study on punitive damage awards
in Cook County and San Francisco conducted by the Rand Cor-
poration's Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ)95 According to the
press kit, the study found:
The average punitive damage award in Cook County increased in
inflation-adjusted dollars from $43,000 in 1965-69 to $729,000 in 1980-84
- a 1,500 percent increase.
In San Francisco, the average punitive damage awards jumped
from an average of $95,000 in 1964-69 to $381,000 in 1980-84 - a 300
percent increase.
The average pmeisonal injury punitive damage award in Cook
County increased from $14,000 in 1965-69 to $1,934,000 in 1980-84 - a
13,700 percent increase.
Business/contract punitive damage awards in Cook County dur-
ing the same period went from $97,000 to $624,000, a 543 percent in-
crease in inflation-adjusted dollars.96
These findings are presented with little or no context and no
satisfactory explanation of the source of the data, the method
of data collection, or the proper method of interpreting the
data. 7 Regardless of the lack of data, such astronomical figures
for the rate of increase in awards present to the reader an ap-
parently clear message that a crisis exists. Used in this way, ag-
gregate data, like horror stories, appeal to emotion and anxiety
rather than to reason. When used together with horror stories,
aggregate data can create a convincing characterization that
calls for the abolition or severe limitation of punitive
damages.98
Because the 'ard data" are a key part of the reformers'
argument, the data also demand closer scrutiny. The findings
of the ICJ study, presented in the press kit, are the most widely
cited data in the punitive damage debate.P The ICJ collected
94. hahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1396.
95. American Tort Reform Association, Punitive Damages Update, Rele-
vant Studies on Tort Reform/Punitive Damages (Apr. 12, 1989) [hereinafter
Relevant Studies].
96. Id..
97. Id.
98. See aso Brief of the American Institute of Architects, supra note 11,
at 23 ('This impressive body of anecdotal evidence of growth in the size and
frequency of punitive awards is supported by the available empirical data. By
far, the most comprehensive empirical study was one conducted by the Rand
Institute for Civil Justice.").
99. See also Daniels, sum note 9, at 299 (noting that "[e]ven more widely
used are data from Jury Verdicts Research, Inc. ('JVR') on awards in malprac-
tice and products liability cases").
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVLEW [Vol. 75:1
data on jury verdicts in both Cook County and San Francisco
using local jury verdict reporters,100 although the Cook County
data typically receive emphasis. Both sides of the debate cite
the ICJ data with equal confidence, thus demonstrating the
problematic nature of the findings.1 1 The reformers, however,
use the data more frequently and more manipulatively than the
defenders of punitive damages. The most prominent use of the
ICJ data in the political debate is the Reagan adrinistration's
Report of the Tort Policy Working Group (Report) 0 2 and in a
subsequent update (Update) of the Report.loa In both docu-
ments, the Reagan administration unequivocally supports the
reform movement, 0 4 and argues for severe limitations on puni-
tive damages, but not their outright abolition. 05
The Report discusses punitive damages in the context of
non-economic damages and their contribution to the alleged ex-
plosive growth in the size of awards generally. The Report, like
Mahoney's essays, places special emphasis on personal injury
cases. According to the Report:
Such non-economic damages are inherently open-ended and sub-
jective, and, therefore, easily susceptible to dramatic inflation. Of in-
terest in this regard is a recent preliminary study by the Institute for
Civil Justice which indicates that the average punitive damage award
in Cook County, Illinois, increased from $63,000 in 1970-74 to $489,000
in 1980-84. Of particular interest is that the average Cook County pu-
nitive damage award in personal injury cases increased from $40,000
in 1970-74 to $1,152,174 in 1980-84.
This explosion in damage awards, particularly in the case of non-
economic damages, is vastly in excess of the rate of inflation over the
comparable period. For whatever reasons, tort damage awards have
100. M. SHANLEY & KL PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY
VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCisCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 19591980 app. A at 79-88
(1983).
101. For instance, the data were used to demonstrate the seriousness of the
problem in TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JusTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORmcN GROUP ON THE CAUSES, Ex-
TENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CuRRENT Cms IN INsuRANCm AVAIL-
ABamIY AND AFFORDABnILY 39-45 (1986) [hereinafter REPORT] (Charts G-I),
and later in TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JuSTICE, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABmTrY Caism 33-38 (1987) [hereinafter UP-
DATE] (Charts C-H, K, L). The data were used to demonstrate the lack of any
serious problem in SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUNrIIVE DAMAGES, SECTION OF
LrIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PUNITIVE DAM:AGE: A CONSTRUC-
TIVE EXAMINATION 17-26 (1986) [hereinafter CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION].
102. REPORT, supra note 101, at 39-45 (Charts G-I).
103. UPDATE, supra note 101, at 33-38 (Charts C-H, K, L).
104. E.g., What the U.S. Government Thinks About Tort Refon. " Look
Who's on Our Side, Uncle Sam, J. Az& INS., 2d Q., 1986, at 23-24.
105. REPORT, supra note 101, at 68-69; UPDATE, supra note 101, at 47-48.
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suddenly soared in the United States without any apparent
justificatio.: 1 6
Accompanying this passage is a chart using ICJ's Cook County
data showing that the average personal injury punitive damage
award increased from $40,000 (in constant dollars) in five cases
in 1970-74 to $271,000 in six awards in 1975-79 to $1,152,000 in
twenty-three awards in 1980-84.107 In a footnote, the Report
adds that the ICJ's "analysis of punitive damage awards in San
Francisco also showed an increase in such awards, though of
lesser magnitude than in Cook County.'10 8
Differences in the presentation of the ICJ data in the press
kit and the Report illustrate the problematic nature of these
findings and their use. The two sources adopt different time
periods in their respective discussions, the press kit using 1965-
69 and 1980-8410 and the Report using 1970-74 and 1980-84.n O
The press kit examines punitive awards overall as well as sepa-
rately, divided into personal injury cases and business or con-
tract cases."' The Report focuses on personal injury cases in
which the numbers are much more dramatic, 1 as does Maho-
ney.n 3 Additionally, discrepancies exist between the figures in
the press kit and in the Report. The press kit cites an average
punitive damage award in Cook County of $1,934,000 in 1980-84
for personal injury cases," 4 while the Report cites a figure of
$1,152,174.31 5 The press kit cites an overall punitive damage
award in Cook County of $729,000 in 1980-84,n 6 and the Report
cites an average of only $489,000.11 Because neither the press
kit nor the Report provides any background for the data used
or for the ICJ study from which the data are taken, the reason
for the differences remains unknown.
The Update also presents ICJ punitive damages data, and it
provides an additional illustration of discrepancies in the evi-
dence and of the problematic nature of "hard data" in this de-
106. REPORT, supm note 101, at 39-42 (footnot6s and chart references
omitted).
107. REPORT, s2L22pma note 101, at 43 (Chart II).
108. REPORT, supr note 101, at 42 n.39.
109. Relevant Studies, sup note 95.
110. REPORT, supr note 101, at 39.
111. Relevant Studies, supmr note 95.
112. REPORT, supra note 101, at 42.
113. Mahoney & Littlejohn, supmr note 10, at 1396.
114. Relevant Studies, supra note 95.
115. REPORT, supra note 101, at 42.
116. Relevant Studies, supr note 95.
117. REPORT, supm note 101, at 39.
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bate. According to the Update, "[t]he available data indicate
that in the last decade the size of punitive damages awards has
undergone almost explosive growth, particularly in personal in-
jury cases.""' 8 The Update states that the ICJ data for Cook
County show "that the average personal injury punitive dam-
age award grew from $28,000 in 1970-74 to $1,934,000 in 1980-84,
a 6,900% increase."' u9 This information conflicts with figures
presented in the Report, which indicate that the average award
increased from $40,000 in 1970-74 to $1,152,174 in 1980-84.' °
The discrepancy is noted without commentary in a footnote in
the Update.12 ' Explaining such discrepancies, however, is not
the important issue in this context. What is important is that
the discrepancies exist and that they receive no discussion that
would allow the reader to make a judgment as to the veracity
of the new figures. If the reformers' goal were to present an
accurate picture of the punitive damages system, the discrepan-
cies would be noted and explained so that the reader can un-
derstand why the award figure increased. From a symbolic
perspective, however, the veracity of the "hard data" used is
less important than the general message they are intended to
send.m
A final problem with the reformers' use of the ICJ data
118. UPDATE, supr note 101, at 49.
119. Id at 49 n.62.
120. REPORT, sI2TGZ note 101, at 42.
121. See UPDATE, supn note 101, at 47 n.54 (referring to M. P=rERSON, S.
SAmiA & M. SHANLEY, upra note 8, at 4).
122. The problematic nature of the 'ard data" is further illustrated by the
fact that the reformers' opponents use the exact same study to argue an en-
tirely different categorization of the punitive damages system. In 1986, the
same year of the BARweos publication, the Special Committee on Punitive
Damages of the ABA's Section of Litigation published a report. See CON-
STRUCTIVE ExAmIATION, supr note 101. This report is based upon a study of
punitive damages commissioned by the Special Committee and conducted by
the ICJ. Id. at 1. This is the ICJ study of punitive damages in Cook County
and San Francisco. According to the Special Committee's report-
The major findings of the Rand study ... suggest that contrary to
the common perception, punitive damages awards are neither routine
nor routinely large, especially in personal injury cases including
[product] liability and malpractice litigation. While punitive damages
awards have grown in frequency and size over the past 25 years, the
bulk of this growth has been in cases of intentional torts, unfair busi-
ness practices or contractual bad faith. The punitive damages picture
in personal injury cases has changed very little in 25 years. Moreover,
while the size of punitive damages awards has increased, most awards
are moderate in amount and the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages is generally not excessive. The multimillion-dollar punitive
award 10 to 20 times the plaintiff's actual damages is, in empirical
terms, not a pattern but an aberration. In short, the findings of this
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concerns the logic of generalization. The ICJ data are from two
case studies, with the Cook County data typically receiving em-
phasis. Case studies have one important limitation. They can-
not be used to assess the general incidence or frequency of
some phenomenon within a population of sites.'2 A case study
does not represent a legitimate sample and cannot serve as the
basis for statistical generalization. Yet the reformers present
the ICJ data as a representative sample, and use the data to
make what are, in effect, statistical generalizations about the
frequency and size of punitive damage awards nationwide.2
One amicus brief in Pacifwt Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Has-
HP125 even claimed that the ICJ data comprise "[a] comprehen-
sive analysis of jury verdicts in the United States."'' 2 Such
generalizations are inappropriate and unfounded no matter
how politically expedient they may be.
At first glance, the horror stories and aggregate data seem
to provide persuasive evidence for the reformers' argument. In
fact, however, they provide little, if any, reliable evidence about
the law in action with regard to punitive damages. They have
been used to create a state of mind in the furtherance of a
political agenda and should be interpreted accordingly. Unfor-
tunately, the reformer's stories and data have been recognized
as systematic and reliable evidence of a punitive damages sys-
tem out of control and in need of immediate and fundamental
reform.;2 The following section presents an alternative empir-
ical description.
study suggest that the notion of a punitive damages "crisis" is exag-
gerated overall and focused an the wrong types of cases.
Id- at 17-18. The use of the same study for opposite conclusions in the punitive
damage debate should make clear the problematic nature of the "hard data"
used in the debate. Again, the purpose is not a reasonably accurate picture of
the punitive damage system, but gaining support for a political agenda.
123. R. YIN, CASE STUDY RasEAncm DESIGN AND METHODS 21 (1984).
124. Even some academics and researchers working in this area have
slipped into this habit. E.g., D. HENsLER, AL VAIANA & M. PrrEESoN, TRENDS
IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STUDY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 14 (1987); Litan,
Swire & Winston, 27ze US. Liability System- Background and Trends, in a.
LrPAN & C. WINSTON, supra note 44, at 8-10; Danzon, Medical Malpratice Lia-
bility, in R. LTAN & C. WINSTON, supra note 44, at 106-107.
125. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So.2d 537 (Ala. 1989), stay
granted, 110 S. Ct. 710, cert granted, 110 S. Ct. 1780 (1990) (No. 89-1279).
126. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chemical anufactur-
ers Association, and the American Corporate Counsel Association, In Support
of Petitioner at 9, Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, No. 89-1279 (U.S. 1990)
(argued Oct % 1990).
127. See REPORT, supra note 101, at 39.
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11. PATTERNS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS:
1981-1985
This section addresses patterns in the incidence and size of
punitive damage awards in a variety of jurisdictions. It relies
on a data set consisting of 25,627 civil jury verdicts involving
money damages from state trial courts of general jurisdiction in
forty-seven counties in eleven states for the years 1981-85.
This time period is used because the reformers' assertions about
punitive damages are based on claims about excesses of the civil
jury system in the early 1980's.
A. THE DATA
The 25,627 case data set uses information drawn from local
jury verdict reporters, which are subscription services devel-
oped for local attorneys, judges, county law libraries, insurance
companies, businesses, and local governmental bodies.' 29 The
purpose of these reporters is to communicate information on
the local "going rates" for various types of legal disputes. This
information is used in settlement negotiations and in evaluating
damages for trial.13° The assumption is that most civil matters
are settled rather than tried, and that jury verdicts in the mi-
nority of matters actually adjudicated play an important role in
determining the worth, or settlement value, of civil matters
filed but not tried.= This practical use of jury verdicts to set
going rates is consistent with recent theoretical writing in the
field of civil litigation that notes the importance of jury verdicts
as "transmitters of signals rather than as deciders of cases."'13 2
The jury verdict reporters used in constructing the data set
were selected because they are comprehensive in their coverage
of money damage cases. They are not limited to a particular
type of case, such as personal injury, nor do they only report
the high end of the damage award spectrum. These reporters
present typical as well as unusual cases, from the $3,000 fender-
128. See Daniels & Martin, Jury Verdicts, supra note 6, at 328.
129. See S. Daniels, Civil Juries, Jury Verdict Reporters, and the Going
Rate, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law & Society Associa-
tion, Chicago, Illinois 5 (May 29 - June 1, 1986).
130. See ii. at 1.
131. The publisher of one of the oldest local jury verdict reporters states in
his promotional material that the information he provides is intended for the
purpose of settling cases. I&
132. L Galanter, Jury Shadows: Reflections on the Civil Jury and the Lit-
igation Explosion 19, paper presented at the 1986 Warren Conference On Ad-
vocacy in the United States 19 (June 12-15, 1986).
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bender to the multi-million dollar products liability case. Court
records and attorneys involved in the cases provide the infor-
mation. The data in each case description include the county in
which the jury rendered the verdict, the names of the parties
and the attorneys, a short description of the factual situation,
the jury's verdict and award if given, apportionment of liability
when appropriate, and a breakdown of the award'into specials,
compensatory, and punitive or exemplary components. 1' For
each of the forty-seven counties in the study, data were col-
lected on all money damage jury verdicts published in the re-
spective jury verdict reporters. No sampling was done within
years and the data generally cover the period 1981-85, although
the number of years covered in some sites i$ less because data
are unavailable. Verdicts in cases in which money damages
were not involved, federal cases, bench trials, settlements, and
post-trial motions are not included.1'
The forty-seven sites included in the study are not a repre-
sentative sample of all jurisdictions across the country. Rather,
they reflect a cdmbination of regional balance and available
source materials. This means that one cannot use the findings
presented to generalize about jury activity on a nationwide ba-
sis. The sites, however, are sufficiently diverse to allow explo-
ration of the complexities and variations in the aggregate
patterns in jury verdicts. The sites are in different parts of the
country and are of varying population sizes and socio-economic
make-ups. Additionally, they reflect legal systems that differ
in basic ways, primarily with regard to negligence systems and
the treatment of punitive damages. The data set includes
sites from one state, Washington, that does not allow punitive
damages at common law, but that by statute does allow extra
damages in certain well-defined situations."3
Table I presents a list of the counties, courts, time periods,
and total number of verdicts in the data set. Combining the
data for each site through the years 1981-85, as is done in Table
I, creates an overall picture of patterns in jury verdicts for the
early 1980's while controlling for year-to-year fluctuations.M
Moreover, five years is too short a period to use in discussing
133. For a more detailed discussion of jury verdict reporters, see S. Daniels,
supra note 129, at 5.
134 I
135. See 1 J. GHiARDI & J. Kutcm, PuNrI DAmAGES: LAW AND PRAC.
TIC, ch. 4, at 25 (1985).
136. I.
137. See Daniels & Martin, Jury Verdicts, supr note 8, at 343-47.
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TABLE I
SITES, COURTS, YEARS, AND NUMBERS OF CIVIL JURY
VERDICTS
County Court Years N of Verdicts
Maricopa, AZ Superior 1981-85 1,765
Alameda, CA Superior 1981-85 357
Fresno, CA Superior 1981-85 157
Los Angeles, CA Superior 1981-85 2,613
Sacramento, CA Superior 1981-85 509
San Diego, CA Superior 1981-85 410
San Francisco, CA Superior 1981-85 668
Arapahoe, CO District 1984-85 51
Boulder, CO District 1984-85 53
Denver, CO District 1984-85 294
Jefferson, CO District 1984-85 94
Cobb, GA Superior 1982-84 90
DeKaib, GA Superior 1982-84 293
Fulton, GA Superior 1982-84 439
Cook, IL Circuit 1981-85 4,181
DuPage, IL Circuit 1981-85 436
Kane, IL Circuit 1981-85 171
Lake, IL Circuit 1981-85 295
McHenry, IL Circuit 1981-85 61
Will, IL Circuit 1981-85 290
Winnebago, IL Circuit 1981-85 148
Johnson, KS District 1981-85 310
Wyandotte, KS District 1981-85 286
Clay, MO Circuit 1981-85 104
Jackson, MO Circuit 1981-85 894
Platte, MO Circuit 1981-85 47
Bronx, NY Supreme 1981-85 367
Erie, NY Supreme 1983-85 181
Kings, NY Supreme 1981-85 762
Monroe, NY Supreme 1983-85 127
Nassau, NY Supreme 1981-85 636
New York, NY Supreme 1981-85 1,101
Onondaga, NY Supreme 1983-85 86
Queens, NY Supreme 1981-85 404
Richmond, NY Supreme 1981-85 71
Suffolk, NY Supreme 1981-85 291
Westchester, NY Supreme 1981-85 259
Multnomah, OR Circuit 1984-85 285
Bexar, TX District 1981-85 1,002
Dallas, TX District 1981-85 2,106
Harris, TX District 1981-85 2,102
King, WA Superior 1983-85 416
Pierce, WA Superior 1983-85 131
Skagit, WA Superior 1983-85 15
Snohomish, WA Superior 1983-85 114
Spokane, WA Superior 1983-85 122
Yakima, WA Sunerior 1983-85 73
TOTAL 25,627
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cbanges and trends considering our limited knowledge of
longer term patterns. All of the data discussed in this section
oppear in this combined form. Changes over time are ex-
amined in Part Iii of this Article, using data from Dallas
County, Texas and Jackson County, Missouri for the period
1970 to 1988.
B. INCIDENCE OF PUNITVE DAMAGE AWARDS GENERALLY
Table II presents data in combined form on the incidence
of punitive damage awards in each of the forty-seven sites for
1981-85. It identifies the total number of punitive awards, the
percentage of all reported money damage verdicts that include
an award of punitive damages, and the percentageof successful
cases (those in which the jury awarded the plaintiff at least one
dollar) in which an award of punitive damages is made. Table
I1 presents two simple but important conclusions. The first is
that, in general, juries do not award punitive damages in a large
percentage of money damage cases. Thus, it appears that puni-
tive damage awards are not routine in money damage cases
overall. The second conclusion is that a great deal of variation
exists among the sites in terms of the number and rates of pu-
nitive damage awards. This second finding suggests that sweep-
ing statements about national trends used to instigate reform
should be viewed with a great deal of skepticism.
Of the 25,627 civil jury verdicts in the data base for the
1981-85 period, 1,287 or 4.9% of the cases include punitive dam-
age awards. This represents 8.8% of the 14,462 cases in which
plaintiffs were successful. The number of punitive damage
awards in all but the largest population centers is below fifty
for this five year time period. Only seven sites experienced
more than fifty punitive damage awards: Los Angeles County,
California, the highest with 169; Maricopa County (Phoenix),
Arizona; Cook County (Chicago), Illinois; Jackson County
(Kansas City), Missouri; Bexar County (San Antonio), Texas;
Dallas County, Texas; and Harris County (Houston), Texas.
Regardless of the raw numbers, the percentage of verdicts
that include a punitive damage award is generally modest.
Eliminating the six Washington sites and concentrating on
those sites that allow punitive damages at common lawiss the
punitive damage rate for all money damage cases, successful
and unsuccessful, ranges from 0% in Erie and Richmond Coun-
138. 1 J. GMARDI & J. KIc sup note 135, at 25.
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TABLE II
REPORTED PUNITIVE DAMAGE JURY VERDICTS
County N of Punitive % of All % of Successful
Damage Verdicts Verdicts Verdicts
Marlicopa, AZ 150 8.5% 14.6%
Alameda, CA 25 7.0 12.5
Fresno, CA 9 5.7 n.4
Los Angeles, CA 169 6.2 3.11
Sacramento, CA 26 7.5 13.8
San Diego, CA 16 3.9 8.0
San Francisco, CA 46 6.7 11.5
Arapahoe, CO 8 15.7 25.8
Boulder, CO 9 17.0 23.1
Denver, CO 20 6.8 12.5
Jefferson, CO 13 13.8 24.5
Cobb, GA "ii 12.2 19.0
DeKalb, GA 18 7.5 12.9
Fulton, GA 38 7.1 12.1
Cook, IL 68 1.6 2.8
DuPage, IL 9 2.1 3.7
Kane, IL 5 2.9 4.8
Lake, IL 6 2.0 3.4
McHenry, IL 2 3.3 6.1
Will, IL 7 2.4 3.9
Winnebago, IL 7 4.7 8.0
Johnson, KS 11 3.5 6.7
Wyandotte, KS 9 3.1 5.1
Clay, MO 15 14.4 24.2
Jackson, MO I11 12.4 22.4
Platte, MO 5 10.6 17.9
Bronx, NY 1 0.3 0.4
Erie, NY 0 - -
Kings, NY 5 0.7 1.1
Monroe, NY 5 3.9 6.4
Nassau, NY 10 1.6 3.6
New York, NY 19 1.7 2.7
Onondaga, NY 1 1.2 2.1
Queens, NY 3 0.7 1.4
Richmond, NY 0 - -
Suffolk, NY 5 1.7 3.3
Westchester, NY 3 1.2 2.9
Multnomah, OR 12 4.2 7.0
Bexar, TX 101 10.1 18.4
Dallas, TX 141 6.7 13.2
Harris, TX 156 7.8 14.0
King, WA 0 - -
Pierce, WA 0 - -
Skagit, WA 1 5.3 6.7
Snohomish, WA 1 0.9 1.5
Spokane, WA 0 - -
Yakima, WA I 1.4 2.2
TOTAL 1,287 4.9% 8.8%
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ties in New York to 15.7% and 17.0% in Arapahoe and Boulder
Counties, Colorado. Both of these high-rate counties, however,
have less than ten punitive damage awards. The numbers are
low in these counties because data are available for only two
years. If one examines only those counties with twenty-five or
more punitive damage awards and a full five years of data,
Jackson and Bexar become the counties with the highest rates
at 12.4% and 10.1% respectively. The lowest rate (1.6%) among
this group of counties with twenty-five or more punitive dam-
age cases is in Cook County.
The punitive damage rates are higher when defined as per-
centages of successful verdicts. After eliminating the Washing-
ton sites along with the two sites with no punitive damage
awards, Erie and Richmond Counties, the rate ranges from
0.4% in Bronx County to 25.8% in Arapahoe County. Concen-
trating on just those sites with twenty-five or more punitive
damage verdicts, the rate varies from 2.8% in Cook County to
22.4% in Jackson County. Jackson is the only site having more
than twenty-five punitive damage verdicts with a punitive dam-
age rate above 15% for successful cases.
Contrary to the rhetoric of the reformers, punitive dam-
ages were not routinely awarded during the early 1980's in the
sites we examined. At its highest level, the punitive damage
rate never exceeded one-quarter of all successful cases or one-
fifth of all cases. Equally important is the substantial variabil-
ity among the sites, suggesting that there are not consistent na-
tional patterns.
C. THE INCIDENCE OF PuNrTVE DAMAGE VERDICTS iN
D=FERNT CATEGORIES OF CASES
A frequent assertion of the reformers is that even if puni-
tive damage awards are not routine in general, they are routine
in certain types of cases. For example, as noted earlier, per-
sonal injury cases purportedly attract frequent punitive damage
awards, particularly those in which the defendant is a so-called
"deep pocket" (especially medical malpractice and products lia-
bility). 3 9 Two methods exist to examine the distribution of pu-
nitive damage awards among different types of cases. The first
examines the distribution of the total number of punitive dam-
age awards across various categories of cases, and the second
139. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1396; REPORT, supra note
101, at 3542.
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examines the punitive damage rate for each of these catego-
ries.140 The distinction is crucial because the two alternatives
present quite different pictures of the punitive damages system.
The picture portrayed by the first approach would suggest that
the reformers are correct in some of their key allegations. The
picture emerging from the alternative approach indicates that
they are not.141
Table I presents a breakdown of punitive damage verdicts
by category of case for the twenty sites having ten or more pu-
nitive damage cases.'4 It groups cases into four broad catego-
ries based on the type of harm involved in each case. The first
category includes all cases in which the primary harm involved
is physical (e.g., auto, assault, slip and fall, medical malprac-
tice). The second category includes all cases in which the pri-
mary harm is financial (e.g., breach of contract, fraud,
misrepresentation, business interference). The third category
involves all cases in which the primary harm is to property and
the fourth category groups all cases involving emotional harm
or damage to reputation.
The approach presented in Table MI, which breaks down
all punitive damage verdicts in a given jurisdiction by type of
case, is the approach typically used in the punitive damages de-
bate. It shows that most punitive damage awards occur in cases
involving either physical or financial harm. Few of the puni-
tive damage awards appear in cases in which the alleged dam-
age is to property or emotional/reputational harm.
The percentage of punitive damage awards in a single ju-
risdiction resulting from claims of physical harm ranges from
5.6% in DeKalb County, Georgia to 55.9% in Cook County. In
fourteen of the twenty counties, at least 20% of the punitive
damage awards occur in cases in which the principal harm is
physical. The percentage of punitive damage awards arising
from claims of financial harm ranges from 8.3% in Multnomah
County (Portland), Oregon to 83.3% in DeKalb County. Finan-
cial harm accounts for at least 50% of punitive damage awards
in slightly more than one-half - eleven - of the counties. The
percentage of punitive damage awards resulting from property
harm ranges from no awards in three sites, Cobb and DeKalb
140. See S. DANmTs & J. MARTn, supra note 8, at 17.
141. Ii at 23.
142. Because of the small numbers of cases within categories, it does not
make sense to include the sites with 10 or less punitive damage cases. When
the numbers are small, the change of even one case can make a substantial
percentage difference.
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counties in Georgia and New York County, to 33.3% in Clay
County, Missouri.
These data appear to support the widespread belief that
many punitive damage awards occur in cases involving physical
harm. Thus, it would seem that the reformers' focus on physi-
cal harm cases as a key ingredient of the punitive damage
"problem" is appropriate. Although on its face a sensible
method of examining the incidence of punitive damage awards,
the approach taken in Table MI is not the most appropriate one.
Table HI distorts perceptions of punitive damage patterns be-
cause it depends on the make-up of the jury docket in a given
jurisdiction. In Table I, the number of cases on the jury
docket relative to other types of cases determines the magni-
tude of the percentage for a given type of case, not the rate at
which punitive damages are awarded. If, for instance, a large
number of physical harm cases are on the jury docket, it is
TABLE III
BREAKDOWN OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE JURY VERDICTS
BY CASE CATEGORY
(Sites with 10+ Punitive Verdicts)
County (N)
Marlcopa, AZ (150)
Almela CA (25)
Los Angeles, CA (169)
Sacramento, CA (26)
San Diego, CA (16)
San Francisco, CA (46)
Denver, CO (20)
Jefferson, CO (13)
Cobb, GA (11)
De alb, GA (18)
Fulton, GA (38)
Cook, IL (68)
Johnson, KS (11)
Clay, MO (15)
Jackson, MO (1M1)
New York, NY (19)
Multnomah, OR (12)
Bexar, TX (101)
Dallas, TX (141)
Harris, TX (156)
Type of Harm Alleged
Physical Financial Property
35.3% 51.3% 6.7%
36.0 40.0 12.0
18.3 56.8 6.5
7.7 69.2 11.5
25.0 56.3 6.3
19.6 58.7 10.7
20.0 65.0 5.0
53.8 30.8 15.4
27.3 45.5 0
5.6 83.3 0
21.1 47.4 13.2
55.9 23.5 2.9
45.5 27.3 18.2
20.0 20.0 33.3
11.7 53.2 14.1
52.6 26.3 0
33.3 8.3 8.3
23.8 56.4 11.9
14.2 63.1 13.5
38.5 50.0 5.1
Emotional
3.3%
16.0
18.3
11.5
12.5
10.7
10.0
0
27.3
11.1
18.4
16.2
0
26.7
20.7
21.1
41.7
7.9
8.5
6.4
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likely that physical harm punitive damage cases will comprise a
relatively large percentage of all punitive damage awards, even
if the rate at which a jury awards punitive damages in physical
harm cases is low. The rate at which a jury awards punitive
damages is the important issue with regard to the frequency of
punitive damage awards. Information regarding how often pu-
nitive damage awards occur in particular types of cases is neces-
sary to draw any conclusions about frequency.
The data from Cook County, the reformers' usual exam-
ple, 43 illustrate the problems of the approach taken in Table
HI. Cook County has the highest percentage of punitive dam-
ages in the physical harm category of all twenty sites - 55.9%.
This figure might easily lead to the conclusion that a plaintiff
with a successful claim based on a cause of action involving
physical harm is very likely to win an award of punitive dam-
ages. In fact, this is a rare occurrence in Cook County.
The high figure in Table HI simply reflects the fact that a
high percentage of all jury cases in Cook County involve physi-
cal harm, rather than the existence of a high punitive damage
rate for such cases. Eighty-one percent of all reported money
damage jury verdicts in Cook County for the years 1981-85 in-
volve claims of physical harm. When the rate of punitive dam-
age awards in physical harm cases in Cook County is examined
- the percentage of plaintiff's verdicts which include a puni-
tive damage award - a very different picture emerges. As Ta-
ble IV shows, the punitive damage rate for physical harm cases
in Cook County is only 1.8%! Using this alternative approach,
Cook County moves from appearing as a jurisdiction with a
high incidence of punitive damage awards predicated upon
physical harm to a jurisdiction with a very low punitive damage
rate in such cases. Using a more appropriate measure makes an
apparent problem disappear.
Table IV presents data on punitive damage rates for the
same sites included in Table I. The figures for physical harm
cases are significantly lower in Table IV then they are in Table
II. The punitive damage rate for physical harm cases ranges
from 1.6% in Sacramento and DeKalb Counties to 25% in Jef-
ferson County. All but two of the sites, Jefferson and Clay
Counties, have rates below 10%. Contrary to'what might be ex-
pected based upon the reformers' rhetoric, punitive damage
awards are far from routine in cases involving claims of physi-
cal harm.
143. See, ag., UPDATE, supr note 101, at 37.
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TABLE IV
PUNITIVE DAMAGE RATES FOR SUCCESSFUL CASES
BY CASE CATEGORY
(Sites with 10+ Punitive Verdicts)
Type of Harm Alleged
County Physical Financial Property Emotional
Maricopa, AZ 9.27 2L3% 16.4% 40.9%
Alameda, CA 6.9 21.3 37.5 28.6
Los Angeles, CA 2.7 38.2 22.9 60.8
Sacramento, CA 1.6 40.9 50.0 30.3
San Diego, CA 2.5 32.1 33.3 20.0
San Francisco, CA 3.6 26.0 23.8 20.8
Denver, CO 4.0 24.1 25.0 66.7
Jefferson, CO 25.0 22.2 28.6 0
Cobb, GA 13.6 18.5 0 60.0
DeKalb, GA 1.6 25.9 0 20.0
Fulton, GA 4.8 19.1 16.7 33.3
Cook, IL 1.8 9.1 2.1 68.8
Johnson, KS 5.4 6.4 9.1 0
Clay, MO 12.0 15.0 41.7 100.0
Jackson, MO 7.0 28.9 20.5 85.2
New York, NY 1.7 5.6 0 26.7
Multnomah, OR 2.9 5.9 20.0 38.5
Bexar, TX 9.8 23.0 30.0 50.0
Dallas, TX 6.1 14.6 23.4 54.2
Harris, TX 7.2 39.0 12.7 47.6
The picture does not change after taking a deeper cut into
the physical harm category and examining medical malpractice
and products liability cases, the two types of cases that the re-
formers emphasize as primary sources of the punitive damages
"explosion y '." Table V draws from the general database of
25,627 verdicts and presents data on punitive damage rates for
these two types of cases. Neither type of case accounts for a
large proportion of the verdicts. Malpractice represents 7.5%
of the 25,627 verdicts and products liability only 3.8%. Con-
trary to what might be expected, Table V indicates that plain-
tiffs usually are not successful in these cases, and that they
rarely receive punitive damage awards in the minority of cases
in which they are successful. The punitive damage rate for sue-
144. See idi at 38.
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cessful cases involving medical malpractice is 2.9%, and 8.9%
for those involving products liability claims.
TABLE V
PUNITIVE DAMAGE RATES:
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Ns With
Success Punitive
Punitive
Award
Ns Rate Award Rate
Medical Malpractice 1,917 32.4% 18 2.9%
Products Liability 967 39.2% 34 8.9%
Returning to a comparison of the figures in Tables HI and
IV, with a focus on the financial harm cases, we see that the
figures in Table IV are again lower than those in Table II. The
punitive damage rate in Table IV for these cases ranges from
5.6% in New York County to 40.9% in Sacramento County.
Although the rates in most sites for cases involving physical
harm are below 10%, the punitive damage rates for financial
harm cases in all but four sites are above 10%. More than half
the sites have rates greater than 20%.
The patterns in the two tables also differ for cases involv-
ing property and emotional/reputational harm. The figures in
Table IV are higher for both types of cases than those in Table
III. For property harm cases, the punitive damage rate ranges
from 0% in three counties, Cobb, DeKalb, and New York, to
50% in Sacramento County. All but six of the counties haVe
punitive damage rates above 10% for property harm cases and
slightly more than one-half have rates of at least 20%. For
emotional/reputational harm cases, the rate ranges from 0% in
two sites, San Diego and Jefferson Counties, to 100% and 85.2%
in Clay and Jackson Counties in Missouri. While two of the
sites have no awards of punitive damages in cases involving
emotional/reputational harm, the remainder of the sites have
rates of at least 20%. More than one-half of the sites have rates
of 40% or higher for emotional/reputational harm cases.
While we are unable to address the issue of the frequency
with which punitive damages are pled and denied, the data in
Table IV reveals the frequency with which juries award puni-
tive damages in different types of cases. Generally, in the sites
examined, a successful plaintiff was least likely to receive a
punitive damage award in a case involving physical harm and
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most likely to receive such an award in an emo-
tional/reputational harm case.
D. PATrERNS IN THE SIZE OF PuNIvE DAMAGE AwARDs
A second major controversy in the punitive damages debate
concerns the issue of the dollar value of punitive damage
awards. According to the reformers, not only are punitive dam-
ages routinely awarded, they are awarded in extremely high
mnounts - amounts that "boggle the mind" and are
"'kyrocketing.' '14 5
A seemingly esoteric, technical debate underlies the issue
of punitive damage award size as well as the issue of jury award
sizes generally. It involves the appropriate measure of central
tendency to use in describing patterns and changes in the typi-
cal award- the arithmetic mean (average) or the median. One
obtains the mean, or average, punitive damage award by adding
the amount of the awards together and dividing by the total
number of awards. The mean's disadvantage is that a few un-
,usually high or low figures in the data set can skew the result
upward or downward. The median punitive damage award, on
the other hand, is the middle figure in a sequence of awards
listed from lowest to highest. A handful of high or low num-
bers in the data will not influence the median. The chosen
measure is both politically and practically significant because
the two measures can give significantly different values to the
typical award.
The reformers advocate the use and appropriateness of the
mean to describe patterns and changes in award sizes.1 8 Their
position is politically expedient because mean punitive damage
awards, as well as mean jury awards generally, are misleadingly
high. 47 The reformers present the mean punitive damage
award as evidence that the civil justice system is out of control
and in need of reform. For example, as noted earlier, the Rea-
gan administration's Tort Policy Working Group's 1986 Repor
presents average award figures to support its claims of sharply
increasing award sizes, and the Repar's Update vigorously
defends the mean as the appropriate measure of central ten-
145. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal Co., 109 S. Ct. 2909,
2924 (1989); Sales & Coles, supra note 12, at 1154.
146. See UPDATE, su ra note 101, at 39-40.
147. See Daniels & Martin, Jury Verdfcts, supra note 8, at 327; Localio,
Variations on $96258: The Misuse of Data on Medical Malpractice, 13 LAW,
MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 126,127 (1985).
148. REPORT, supra note 101, at 42.
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dency.149 The Update's defense is a direct response to critics of
the Report who challenged the appropriateness of the mean and
the resulting claim of increasingly higher awardsUo The critics
point out that "[flor jury awards, the median is much smaller
than the average, which can be significantly influenced upward
by a few very large claims."l
Regardless of the political considerations, as a technical
matter, the median is more appropriate in this instance. Ac-
cording to a widely used textbook on statistics for the social
sciences:
The layman's conception of the term average is likely to be rather
vague or ambiguous. In fact, one may not realize that there are sev-
eral distinct measures of typicality and that under some circum-
stances these measures may yield very different results. The fact that
it is possible to obtain such different measures of central tendency
means that it is necessary to understand the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each measure. 52
Hubert Blalock, the author of this text, notes that the average
is generally used in preference to the median, but not always.1sa
There is an all-important difference between the two measures.
f27he mean is affected by changes in extreme values whereas the me-
dian will be unaffected unless the value of the middle case is also
changed....
... We may say, then, that whenever a distribution is highly
skewed, i.e., whenever there are considerably more extreme cases in
one direction than another, the median will generally be more appro-
priate than the mean.15
The Update takes this difference and turns it on its head to
make a fallacious argument in defense of the mean and against
the median. In responding to its critics the Update argues:
The use of the median data essentially obscures - to the point of
non-recognition - the effects of 'ligh-end" verdicts on the trend in
jury awards. But, as noted, these 'high-end" verdicts, while only a
small percentage of all jury awards, represent a very large percentage
of the total dollars awarded by juries. Accordingly, median data sub-
stantially understate the growth of jury verdicts by eliminating or at
149. UPDATE, supra note 101, at 39-40.
150. See NATIONAL AssocIArIoN OF ATroRNEYs GENERAL, AN ANALYSIS OF
THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAF-
FORDABILITY OF LiAn= INsuRANCE 26 (1986).
151. I at 27.
152. H. BLALOCI4 SoCiAL STATISTICS 55 (rev. 2d ed. 1979) (emphasis in
origina).
153. Id. at 69-70.
154. Id. (emphasis in original).
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least greatly obscuring the effect of the large awards? 55
As this response makes clear, the mean is useful to the reform-
ers' attempt to substantiate claims of "skyrocketing" awards. If
one uses the median, the response implies, there is little or no
evidence of skyrocketing awards. The Update thus accuses crit-
ics of playing politics with the issue of the appropriate measure:
"It is perhaps for that reason [the median being unaffected by
extreme values] that critics of the Working Group's Report
have so enthusiastically embraced the use of median rather
than average verdicts."156
The award figures from Cook County for the period 1981-
85 illustrate the differences between the mean and the me-
dian . -7 The mean award for all plaintiff's verdicts, not just in
punitive damage cases, is $172,541 (in 1985 dollars). Table VI
shows that the median award is only $10,382. Examining the
proportion of successful plaintiffs' victories with a jury award
lower than the mean demonstrates the degree to which the dis-
tribution of awards in Cook County is skewed toward the low
dollar end of the scale. Eighty-eight percent of all verdicts in
which the plaintiff won at least one dollar are lower than the
average award in Cook County for the years 1981-85. Thus, the
median will present a radically different picture of the punitive
damages system than the mean and places the alleged problem
of award size in a new and interesting light.
Table VI presents further data on the median award for all
of the sites in Tables III and IV - those with more than ten
punitive damage awards for the period 1981-85. It shows the
median punitive damage award, the median total award (in-
cluding both compensatory and punitive damages) for those
cases that include a punitive award, and the median total award
for all successful cases. All dollar figures represent 1985 dol-
lars, the last year included in the data set.
Table VI indicates that in most of the sites, the median pu-
nitive damage award is not at a level that is likely to "boggle
the mind." Fifteen of the twenty sites have median punitive
damage awards below $40,000, thirteen of the sites have median
punitive damage awards below $30,000. All five of the sites
with the higher medians are in California. These higher medi-
ans for the California sites suggest that there may be a few lo-
155. UPDATF, supm note 101, at 39.
156. IX (emphasis in original).
157. These data are from our own research; they are not drawn from the
Rand studies.
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cations where punitive damages are relatively high.
Nonetheless, the general pattern is one of low to modest
awards.
TABLE VI
MEDIAN AWARDS IN 1985 DOLLARS
(Sites with 10+ Punitive Verdicts)
Median Median Total Median Total
County Punitive in Punitive Cases in All Cases
Maricopa, AZ $26,450 $46,913 $20,702
Alameda, CA 90,000 206,500 64,900
Los Angeles, CA 111,000 260,000 84,240
Sacramento, CA 180,400 412,580 51,000
San Diego, CA 204,000 352,424 69,444
San Francisco, CA 87,800 21225 68,687
Denver, CO 20,800 139,100 48,500
Jefferson, CO 20,000 86,400 20,800
Cobb, GA 10,800 16,452 11,074
DeKalb, GA 6,820. 12,755 8,433
Fulton, GA 21,252 45,445 20,720
Cook, IL 19,184 38,222 10,382
Johnson, KS 5,570 12,980 9,687
Clay, MO 32,400 54,000 17,933
Jackson, MO 14,788 24,608 11,855
New York, NY 39,520 141,042 186,100
Multnomah, OR 26,000 38,689 25,900
Bexar, TX 25,500 50,534 16,911
Dallas, TX 25,960 66,525 19,698
Harris, TX 25,000 54,870 16,510
The second column in Table VI presents data on the me-
dian total award in cases that include a punitive damage award.
Although higher than the median for all money damage cases,
these figures are still surprisingly modest for most sites consid-
ering the reformers' claims of skyrocketing award sizes. Six-
figure medians do appear in the California sites as well as Den-
ver and New York Counties. All seven of these sites with
higher total median amounts, however, are sites with higher
medians for all money damage cases.
The third column in Table VI shows that the typical jury
award overall is also rather modest in most sites. In twelve of
the twenty jurisdictions, the median for money damage cases
generally is less than $25,000, hardly an amount to support the
reformers' rhetoric concerning rapidly increasing award sizes.
[Vol. 75:1
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Only the five California sites and New York County have over-
all medians in excess of $50,000. New York County is the only
site with a six-figure median.
E. SUMMARY
The results of this study are surprising considering the re-
formers' rhetoric concerning punitive damages. In the sites
studied, punitive damages were not routinely awarded. Nor
were punitive damages typically given in amounts that "boggle
the mind." Juries awarded punitive damages infrequently, and
when they were awarded, the amount was generally modest.
Even in Cook County, the reformers' key example in the policy
debate, punitive damage awards were rare, and the amounts of
those awards were typically low. Furthermore, juries were
least likely to award plaintiffs punitive damages in physical
harm cases, even if that case involved medical malpractice or
products liability. Courts were more likely to award plaintiffs
punitive damages in financial harm and property harm cases
and most likely to award such damages in emotional/reputa-
tional harm cases.
The punitive damages system that emerges from this study
is significantly different than the system described by the re-
formers, and does not provide evidence of a nationwide prob-
lem. Thus, one should view with skepticism the claims that
juries routinely awarded punitive damages, that they routinely
awarded punitive damages in large amounts, and that these de-
velopments are nationwide in scope. Furthermore, one should
also question the efficacy of proposed reforms that presume the
veracity of such claims. The next section of this Article exam-
ines the accuracy of the reformers' final proposition, that the
frequency and size of these awards are rapidly increasing.
II. PATTERNS OVER TIME: 1970-1988
A. THE DATA
Perhaps the most dramatic and evocative of the reformers'
allegations is their claim that the frequency and size of punitive
damage awards have changed dramatically in recent years.
Proponents of reform assert that awards are skyrocketing to
unprecedented levels.15 They typically present data from
three time periods (1960-64, 1970-74, and 1980-84) in Cook
158. Sales & Coles, supm note 12, at 1154-58; Brief of the American Insti-
tute of Architects, supra note 11, at 21-28.
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County and San Francisco to support their allegations of rising
punitive damage awards.' 5 9 .
Ideally, a study of changes in awards would involve an ex-
amination of patterns and changes in the incidence and size of
punitive damage verdicts over a long period of time, perhaps
from the time Morris wrote his article in the 1930's,160 to the
present. Unfortunately, available data do not allow such a
long-term view. The available data only permit a study of
changes in the recent past. Even such a short-term approach,
however, is valuable in assessing the reformers' allegations of
dramatic change, which are themselves based on short-term
surveys.
To explore patterns and changes in punitive damage ver-
dicts in recent years, we examine Dallas County, Texas and
Jackson County, Missouri for the period 1970-88. These sites
certainly are not representative of the nation as a whole, and
one should not view them as such. Rather, these two case stud-
ies provide a foundation for understanding patterns and
changes in jury verdicts over time.161 We chose these sites as
case studies for two reasons.162 The scarcity of data limits the
number of sites available for study, and data are available for
these two sites. In addition, both sites show a relatively high
rate of punitive damage awards for the period 1981-85.
TABLE VII
DALLAS AND JACKSON COUNTIES: 1970-1988
Median
Success N of Punitive Punitive
Site N Rate Punitive Rate Award ($88)
Dallas 7,097 49.4% 454 12.9% $22,770
Jackson 3,056 51.9% 232 14.6% $17,212
Table VII provides an overview of activity in Dallas and
Jackson Counties for the period 1970-88. It presents aggregate
data for this time period on the total number of money damage
verdicts, the plaintiff success rate, the number of punitive dam-
159. See UPDATE, sum note 101, at 33-38.
160. See sun' note 3 and accompanying text.
161. See R. YN, supm note 123, at 21, 38-41.
162. The authors also chose these sites to provide sites different from those
typically used in discussions of jury verdicts - Cook County and San Fran-
cisco. See e g., UPDATE, supm note 101, at 33-38.
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age verdicts, the punitive damage rate, and the median punitive
damage award expressed in 1988 dollars, the last year covered.
The aggregate success rate for each county is very close to
50%. Thus, juries awarded plaintiffs a verdict for at least one
dollar in about one-half of the cases. The punitive damage rate,
representing the proportion of successful verdicts that include
an award for punitive damages, for each county is below 15% -
14.6% in Jackson and 12.9% in Dallas. The median punitive
damage award in each county is rather modest.
These aggregate figures, however, might mask patterns and
changes throughout the nineteen year interval. The next sec-
tion breaks down and analyzes the data in shorter time frames
to determine if patterns emerge within the longer time period.
This breakdown provides a timeline for jury awards leading to
the relatively higher rates evident in 1981-85, and a basis for
evaluating the reformers' claims of steadily increasing awards
up to, and beyond, the early 19801s.
B. OVERALL PuNITIVE DAMAGE RATES
Figure I presents trend data on punitive damage rates for
Dallas, Jackson, and Cook Counties for 1970-88. Cook County
data are included because Cook County is so important to the
reformers' allegations of rapidly increasing frequency of such
awards. Figure I shows three very different patterns over time.
In Dallas County, the punitive damage rate fluctuates within a
relatively narrow range between 1970 and 1984. During these
years the rate ranges from 6.6% in 1971 to 15.3% in 1978. After
1984, the rate steadily increases, reaching 25.6% in 1987. It then
falls to 21.9% in 1988. In Jackson County, the pattern is differ-
ent. Between 1970 and 1979, the punitive damage rate fluctu-
ates within a relatively narrow range, from 5.5% in 1971 to
15.5% in 1976. It increases steadily after 1979, reaching a peak
of 23.7% in 1983. The rate falls sharply to 7.9% in 1987, only to
rise to 15% in 1988.
A comparison of the punitive damage rates in Jackson and
Dallas Counties presents an interesting picture, quite different
from what one would expect in light of the reformers' rhetoric.
For most of the 1970's, the rates for each site remain within
well-defined ranges with no directional trend. This rough simi-
larity ends in the late 1970's as each county follows its own
course. While Jackson County's punitive damage rate increases
steadily after 1979, the Dallas County rate increases very little.
When the Dallas County rate begins a more pronounced in-
1990]
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crease in the mid-1980's, the Jackson County rate decreases.
These divergent patterns illustrate the futility of discussing a
generalized national trend and of choosing any single jurisdic-
tion as a basis for identifying and defining such a trend.
The Cook County data in Figure I further demonstrate this
point. The pattern for Cook County is very different from the
patterns for Dallas and Jackson Counties. The Cook County
punitive damage rate remains surprisingly stable during the en-
tire nineteen year period, maintaining a very low level. The
rate fluctuates within an extremely narrow range, between
0.6% in 1971 and 4.1% in 1978. It exceeds 2% in only eight
years.
Thus, rather than providing support for a consistently and
dramatically increasing punitive damage rate as a broad, na-
tional phenomenon, Figure I suggests diversity in patterns and
changes in punitive damage rates across the country. A na-
tional trend may not exist and jurisdictions may not experi-
ence the same patterns and changes over time. There may be
only local trends in which some areas have increasing rates,
some have decreasing rates, and still others, such as Cook
County, experience no significant change. At best, some areas
may share similar trends for punitive damage rates, but this re-
mains an empirical question for future research.
The explanations for variations in overall punitive damage
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rates are complex. To begin exploring the reasons for the vari-
ations, the next section breaks down the overall rate and ex-
ammes patterns over time for the punitive damage rates in
broad types of cases in Dallas and Jackson Counties.
C. PuNnm DAmAGE RATES FOR DFEmRurQ CATEGORmS
OF CASES
Figure II presents punitive damage rates for physical harm
cases in Dallas and Jackson Counties during the nineteen year
period of 1970-88. The most striking aspect of the chart is the
very low rates. For example, the punitive damage rate for
physical harm cases in Jackson County never rises above 9.4%.
The reformers' rhetoric suggests that there should be a steady
increase in the rate for these cases over time, or at the very
least an increase after 1979 similar to the increase in Figure I
for the overall rate.16s Neither of these patterns, however, ap-
pear in Figure H. In Jackson County, plaintiffs obtained a suc-
cessful verdict in 831 physical harm cases between 1970 and
1988. Juries awarded plaintiffs punitive damages in only thirty-
four of those 831 cases for a punitive damage rate of 4.1% in
physical harm cases.
In Dallas County, the punitive damage rate for physical
harm cases fluctuates within a narrow range between 1970 and
1985. The rate varies from 0% in 1970 to 9.7% in 1985. It
increases to 23.5% in 1986 and 20.4% in 1987, but declines sub-
stantially to 6.7% in 1988. The punitive damage rate for physi-
cal harm cases in Dallas County increases at the same time that
the plaintiff success rate for physical harm cases in Dallas
County decreases.' M This finding suggests that the declining
likelihood of plaintiff success may produce the increase in the
punitive damage rate. Because the punitive damage rate is cal-
culated from successful plaintiffs' verdicts, a decline in the suc-
cess rate and a roughly constant number of punitive damage
verdicts will result in an increase in the punitive damage rate.
This is the situation in Dallas County. Overall, plaintiffs ob-
tained a successful verdict in 1,081 physical harm cases in Dal-
las County during the 1970-88 period. The courts awarded
plaintiffs punitive damages in sixty-six of those cases for a pu-
nitive damage rate for physical harm cases of 6.1%.
Figure HI presents data on punitive damage rates for finan-
163. See supmn' notes 92-98, 106-08 and accompanying text.
164. See suznu Table VIL
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cial harm cases in Dallas and Jackson Counties. The patterns
contrast with those in Figure II. The rates for financial harm
cases are higher than the rates for physical harm cases, and
they exhibit different patterns over the nineteen year period.
In Jackson County, the punitive damage rate ranges from 0%
in 1971 to 37.5% in 1973 and 38.9% in 1985. This range for puni-
tive damage awards is greater than the range for Dallas County
and greater than the range for physical harm cases in Figure H.
Significantly, however, the Jackson County rates in Figure III
exhibit no clear upward or downward trend. The rates fluctu-
ate widely in no apparent pattern. Overall, plaintiffs obtained
successful verdicts in 598 financial harm cases in Jackson
County. Juries awarded plaintiffs punitive damages in 128 of
these cases for a punitive damage rate of 21.4%.
In Dallas County, the punitive damage rate for financial
harm cases fluctuates within a narrower range than in Jackson
County, from 5% in 1980 to 29.9% in 1988. In addition, an iden-
tifiable pattern emerges in Dallas County. From 1970 to 1977,
the punitive damage rate is stable, ranging between 8.6% in
1971 and 13.9% in 1975. In 1978, the rate increases to 23.5%,
and then declines sharply to 5% in 1980. During the early
1980's, the rate steadily increases to 23% in 1985. It falls to
18.5% in 1986, but then rises to 29.6% in 1988. Thus, starting in
1980, a gradual upward trend emerges. Overall, plaintiffs ob-
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FIGURE III
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taied 1,905 successful financial harm verdicts in Dallas County
for the 1970-88 period. Plaintiffs were awarded punitive dam-
ages in 274 of those cases for a punitive damage rate of 14.4%.
The highest rates for punitive damage awards in Dallas and
Jackson Counties are in emotional/reputational harm cases. In
many years, the rate is 1001 in both counties. Unfortunately,
the low numbers of successful cases in each year make it impos-
sible to discuss long-term patterns. In Jackson County, plain-
tiffs obtained a successful verdict in eighty-one
emotional/reputational harm cases. Plaintiffs were awarded
punitive damages in fifty-three of those eighty-one cases for a
punitive damage rate of 65.4%. In Dallas County, the plaintiffs
obtained a successful verdict in seventy-eight emo-
tional/reputational harm cases. Plaintiffs- received punitive
damages in fifty-one cases for an overall punitive damage rate
of 65.4%.
The findings regarding punitive damage rates for different
categories of cases in Dallas and Jackson Counties parallel
*those outlined in Part I1 of this Article. Plaintiffs were least
likely to receive a punitive damage award in a physical harm
case. In fact, punitive damage awards were rare in either
county for such cases. Plaintiffs were somewhat more likely to
receive a punitive award in financial harm cases, but punitive
damage awards were still far from routine in these cases.
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Plaintiffs were most likely to receive a punitive award in emo-
tional/reputational harm cases, with nearly two-thirds of the
successful plaintiffs being awarded punitive damages. The
number of successful emotional/reputational cases, however, is
too small to provide a basis for any conclusion about trends in
the rate courts award punitive damages. Neither physical harm
nor financial harm cases demonstrate dramatic trends over
time. Figure 11 shows relatively low, stable rates in both coun-
ties for physical harm cases, generally below 10%. The only ex-
ceptions occur in 1986 and 1987 for Dallas County when the
rate exceeded 20%, but these rates do not mark the beginning
of an upward trend because the rate drops to below 7% in 1988.
The only evidence of a trend is in Dallas County for financial
harm cases. As Figure III shows, however, this is a gradual
trend, hardly the type of change to be expected in light of the
reformers' claims of crisis.
D. AWARD SIZES
The reformers' final claim is that the size of punitive dam-
age awards has risen to unprecedented levels. They imply that
most punitive damage awards are in six-figure amounts or even
higher. This section examines typical award sizes to evaluate
the widespread belief that punitive damage awards have risen
to unforeseen levels.
Figure IV presents data on patterns and changes in median
punitive damage awards (expressed in 1988 dollars) in Dallas
and Jackson Counties for the period 1970 to 1988. For compara-
tive purposes, Figure V shows patterns and changes in median
total awards for all successful cases (again in 1988 dollars).
Two very different patterns for median punitive damage
awards appear in Figure IV. In Jackson County, the pattern
for punitive damage awards fluctuates, but follows no particu-
lar trend over time after the initial, sharp decline in the early
1970's. The median awards in Jackson County were generally
modest, not exceeding $25,000 in thirteen of the nineteen years.
This pattern of relative stability in the typical award also ap-
pears in Figure V for the median total award for all money
damage cases in Jackson County. The median total award fluc-
tuated between $9,145 in 1974 and $22,785 in 1987, and only ex-
ceeded $20,000 once in 1987.
In Dallas County, the award pattern for punitive damages
is quite different. Figure IV shows that the median punitive
damage award fluctuates within a narrow range during the
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FIGURE IV
MEDIAN PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD:
1970-88 (88$)
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1970's, between $6,654 and $23,060. During this period, the me-
dian exceeds $20,000 only once, in 1970. After 1979, the median
punitive award varies widely, as evidenced by the steep peaks
and valleys in Figure IV. From 1980 to 1988, the median ranges
from $17,982 in 1983 to $75,000 in 1988. With the exception of
1983, the median is greater than $20,000 in each year and ex-
ceeds $40,000 in three years - 1982, 1984, and 1988.
Figure V shows that in Dallas and Jackson Counties, for
median total awards, the patterns again diverged. In Dallas
County, a distinct, but not sharp, upward trend appears after
1979. Interestingly, the wide fluctuations that appear in Figure
IV do not arise in Figure V. From 1970 to 1979, the median to-
tal award for all money damage cases in Dallas County ranges
between $4,948 and $16,045. After 1979, the median gradually
increases. It reaches its highest level of $36,519 in 1987, but de-
creases slightly in 1988.
Figures VI and VII illustrate these patterns and changes in
more detail. They present the interquartile range for punitive
damage awards, which is the distance between the 25th and
75th percentile when one orders the awards from the lowest to
the highest. The graphs are intended to identify underlying di-
rectional trends over time. A vertical line for each time period
shows the distance between the 25th percentile and the 75th
percentile. The 25th percentile marks the bottom of the line
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for each time period, and it is the point at which 25% of the
awards are less than this dollar amount when one orders the
awards from lowest to highest. The 75th percentile marks the
top of the line for each time period, and it is the point at which
25% of the awards are higher than this dollar figure and 75%
are lower. The median, or 50th percentile, is the solid line that
cuts through each interquartile range.
The graphs trace patterns over five time periods. They
combine data for each time period to smooth out the peaks and
valleys in awards, such as those in Figure IV, so that any under-
lying trends will emerge. If the size of punitive damage awards
generally has increased substantially over time, not only should
the median increase, but the 25th and 75th percentiles should
also move upward at a similar rate.
The most noticeable aspect of Figure VI is the absence of
the wide fluctuations in the median punitive damage award
that appear in Figure IV. Instead, there is an underlying pat-
tern of gradual increase in the median to 1982-85, and then a
leveling off. The median punitive damage award in this
smoothed pattern peaks at $28,940 in 1986-88. The 25th percen-
tile in Figure VI increases only slightly over time, ranging from
$2,885 in 1970-73 to $7,688 in 1986-88. The most dramatic
changes appear in the 75th percentile and in the widening dis-
tance between the 25th and 75th percentiles, especially in 1978-
81. The 75th percentile increases from $44,340 in 1970-73 to
$97,620 in 1978-81. It decreases to $89,337 in 1982-85, and then
increases again to $112,513 in 1986-88. Thus, the pattern in Fig-
ure VI is not a simple one of a dramatic increase over time in
punitive awards generally, but rather one of an increase in the
top 25% of the award distribution. If a substantial increase oc-
curred in the size of punitive damage awards generally, the
graph would show increases in the 25th percentile and the me-
dian to match those of the 75th percentile.
Figure VII presents a very different pattern for Jackson
County. The median punitive damage award decreases slightly
from 1970-73 to 1974-77. Following 1977, the median stabilizes
with only a slight increase. The median peaks at $18,095 in
1986-88. The pattern for the 25th percentile is similar. The
25th percentile is $22,145 in 1970-73, but decreases to $8,081 in
1974-77. It falls again to $4,582 in 1978-81, then gradually in-
creases to $5,725 in 1986-88. Again, the most dramatic changes
involve the 75th percentile. It drops sharply after 1970-73 from
$72,012 to $27,806 in 1974-77, but then increases to $65,490 in
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FIGURE VII
RANGE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGE
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1978-81. The 25th percentile and the median both decrease dur-
ing the same time period. These data indicate that the increase
in 1978-81 involves only those punitive damage cases at the high
end of the award distribution, rather than punitive damage ver-
dicts generally. Although details differ, the general patterns
over time in Jackson and Dallas Counties are similar in this as-
pect. After 1978-81, the 75th percentile increases significantly
while the median and 25th percentile remain relatively stable.
The patterns in Figures VI and VII suggest that any
changes that have occurred in the punitive damages award
structure have been at the high end of the scale. There are, in
effect, two punitive damage systems in Jackson and Dallas
Counties. One changes relatively little between 1970 and 1988,
and it is comprised of the bulk of the cases. The second in-
volves only the small proportion of cases with the highest
awards. These few cases with the greatest award sizes explain
the changes in Figures VI and VII.
E. THE TOP TWmY-FVE PERCENT OF THE AwARD
DISTRIBUTION
To further explore this second punitive damage system,
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this section examines the types of cases that account for the
highest 25% of the award structure for each of the five time pe-
riods used above. The purpose is to describe the higher award
punitive damage cases in more detail and not to make claims
about their incidence or rates. The figures do not indicate a
plaintiff's likelihood of receiving a high punitive damage award
in a particular type of case. Instead, the data identify the cate-
gories of cases that constitute the highest 25% of the award
structure for punitive damages in the two counties. The re-
formers' claims would lead to the expectation that this second
system of unusually high awards is increasingly comprised of
physical harm cases, particularly products liability and medical
malpractice cases.165 This is not the situation, however, in Dal-
las and Jackson Counties.
Table VII shows the composition of the top 25% of the pu-
nitive damage award distribution for Dallas and Jackson Coun-
ties using the same time periods as in Figures VI and VII and
the same case categories as in Tables I and IV. The table
presents the percentage of punitive damage cases in each cate-
gory, with the number of punitive damage cases for each time
period in parentheses. For both counties, the overwhelming
proportion of high award punitive damage cases involve finan-
cial harm, not physical harm. In Dallas County, the proportion
of punitive damage awards in financial harm cases remains
within a 10% range between 61.5% and 71%. The other three
categories experience greater fluctuations.
A more detailed examination shows that slightly more
than one-half of the financial harm eases in Dallas County in-
volve fraud. Overall, there are 116 cases in the top 25% of the
punitive damage award distribution in Dallas County for the
period 1970-88. Of these 116 cases, 68.1% (79) involve financial
harm. Fraud comprises 51.9% (41 of 79) of those financial harm
cases, with the largest number of fraud cases involving real es-
tate fraud (9 of 41). Twenty-four of the seventy-nine financial
harm cases concern contractual matters and only one of those
twenty-four cases is a bad faith suit against an insurance com-
pany. Finally, ten of the seventy-nine financial harm cases in-
volve business practices, such as tortious interference, and
three cases involve landlord/tenant matters.
Nineteen, or 16.4%, of the top 25% of punitive damages
awards in Dallas County involve physical harm. Surprisingly,
165. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supm note 10, at 1396; UPDATE, supm note
101, at 35-38.
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TABLE VIII
BREAKDOWN OF HIGHEST 25% OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARD DISTRIBUTION BY
HARM: DALLAS AND
JACKSON, 1970-88
Type of Harm Alleged
Physical Financial Property Emotional
DALLAS
1970-73 (N=13) 7.7% 61.5% 15.4% 15.4%
1974-77 (N=20) 10.0 70.0 15.0 5.0
1978-81 (N=21) 9.5 66.7 4.8 19.0
1982-85 (N=31) 19.4 67.7 9.7 3.2
1986-88 (N=31) 25.8 71.0 3.2 0
TOTAL 116 16.4% 68.1% 8.6% 6.9%
JACKSON
1970-73 (N=5) 20.0% 40.0% 0% 40.0%
1974-77 (N=8) 12.5 62.5 0 25.0
1978-81 (N=13) 0 40.2 23.1 30.8
1982-85 (N=23) 21.7 52.2 4.3 21.7
1986-88 (N=12) 25.0 75.0 0 0
TOTAL 61 16.4% 55.7 6.6 21.3
only three of these nineteen are product liability cases. More-
over, each of the products liability cases occurs in a separate
time period. Thus, there is no trend of an increasing number of
products liability cases at the high end of the punitive damage
award distribution in Dallas County. Even more surprisingly,
only one medical malpractice case appears among the highest
awards and it occurs in the 1982-85 period. Of the physical
harm cases in the top 25% of the award distribution for Dallas
County, vehicular accidents appear most frequently, with five
overall. The remaining ten physical harm cases represent vari-
ous subjects, including premises liability (3), assault (2), work
injury (1), toxic tort (1), and negligence (1).
Contrary to what might be expected, therefore, medical
malpractice and products liability cases do not constitute a
large proportion of the cases in the top 25% of the punitive
damage award distribution in Dallas County. Rather, cases in-
volving fraud, contractual matters, and business practices domi-
nate the high end of the punitive damage distribution. These
cases cause the increase in the 75th percentile over time in Fig-
ure VI.
The composition of the highest 25% in the award distribu-
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tion for Jackson County is roughly similar to that for Dallas
County. Table VI shows that financial harm cases again dom-
inate, reaching 75% of all cases in this part of the award distri-
bution in 1986-88. Physical harm cases are much less
prominent. Only two physical harm cases appear during the
first two time periods in Jackson County, an assault case and a
medical malpractice case. Five physical harm cases occur in
1982-85: three products liability cases, one work injury case,
and one negligence case. Then in 1986-88, there are three phys-
ical harm cases: one vehicular accident case, one assault case,
and one products liability case. Overall, physical harm cases
comprise 16.4% of the cases in the top 25% of the distribution
in Jackson County.
Financial harm cases account for thirty-four, or 55.7%, of
the cases in the top 25% of the distribution in Jackson County.
The financial harm cases fairly evenly represent four categories
of cases: fraud (9), employment matters (9), business practices
(9), and contractual matters (7). The prevalence of employ-
ment matters results from a Missouri statute that allows indi-
viduals to sue their former employers in certain situations;16 a
provision not enacted in Texas. 67
In summary, financial harm cases accounted for the largest
proportion of cases in the top 25% of the punitive damage
award distribution in both Dallas and Jackson Counties. Addi-
tionally, the proportion represented by financial harm cases in-
creased over time. Although the proportion of physical harm
cases also increased, the numbers remained relatively small.
No upward trend, or trend of any kind, emerged for products
liability and medical malpractice cases, the categories most dis-
cussed by the reformers.16s Rather, the driving force behind
the changes in the 75th percentile in Figures VI and VII are
cases involving fraud, contractual issues, employment matters,
and business practices.
F. PuNiTvE DAMAGES IN RELATION TO OTHER DAMAGES
Two remaining issues in the punitive damages debate con-
cern the percentage of a total award represented by punitive
166. Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.140 (Vernon Supp. 1990); see czso Comment, Mis.
sourl's Service Letter Statute Its Reach, Effect and Constitutionality, 52
UMKC L. REV. 641 (1984) (describing the scope and effect of recent amend.
ment to this statute).
167. See Comment, supr note 167, at 665.
168. See REPORT, supra note 101, at 35-40.
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damages and the ratio of punitive damages to all other dam-
ages. Both of these issues have long been debated. In fact,
Morris noted the need for systematic, empirical information on
the issue of proportionality in his 1931 article' 69 The rhetoric
of reform suggests that courts typically award punitive damages
in amounts that far exceed compensatory damages. 70 Further-
more, this disparity between compensatory and punitive dam-
ages is allegedly increasing over timeY71 Reformers claim that
punitive damages are responsible for a general explosion in
awards.
Figure VIII shows the percentage of total awards repre-
sented by punitive damages for both Dallas and Jackson Coun-
ties. It presents this information as an average percentage and
as a median percentage. The graph uses the same time periods
as in Figures VI and VII to smooth out the peaks and valleys in
the year-to-year patterns and thereby reveal underlying trends.
FIGURE VIIi
PERCENT OF TOTAL CASE AWARD
MADE UP BY PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 1970-88
PERCENT OF TOTAL AWARD100
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Figure VIII shows that in Jackson County, where the typi-
cal punitive damage award is lower than in Dallas County, the
percentage of the total award that punitive damages represent
169. Morris, supr note 3, at 1182.
170. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
171. I&
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is consistently higher than in Dallas County for both the aver-
age percent and the median percent. Contrary to the reform
rhetoric, the data show surprising stability over time in Jackson
County, rather than an increase. The average percentage fluc-
tuates within a narrow range, from 66% in 1970-73 to 68% in
1982-85. The median percentage also remains within a rela-
tively narrow range, from 63% in 1974-77 to 78% in 1982-85.
Following a slight decrease in 1974-77, during the 1980's the me-
dian percentage gradually increases to its earlier levels. Thus,
neither measure of central tendency provides evidence of a
long-term directional trend in Jackson County for the percent-
age of the total award represented by punitive damages. In-
stead, the data show stability, especially for the average
percentage.
The pattern in Dallas County in Figure VII for the aver-
age percent of the total award that punitive damages represent
is roughly similar to that for Jackson County. The average
percentage for Dallas County is relatively stable, although it
decreases slightly in 1982-85. The median percentagds for the
two counties, however, have divergent patterns. In Dallas
County, after a slight increase in 1978-81, the median percent-
age decreases, while in Jackson County, the median percentage
increases gradually from 1974-77 to 1982-85 and then levels off.
Therefore, although the patterns for the two sites differ,
neither county experiences a sharply increasing trend over
time that would be expected in light of the rhetoric of reform.
Another method of examining the proportionality issue is
to compare the ratio of punitive damages to all other damages
(P/T - P, where P = punitive award and T = total award).
Again, the reformers' claims suggest that the ratio will be high
and that the size of the ratio will increase over time. Figure IX
shows the ratio of punitive damages to all other damages for
Dallas and Jackson Counties. These data differ from those in
Figure VIII in an important aspect. The percentages in Figure
VI have a maximum upper limit (100%), while the ratios in
Figure IX have no upper limit. As with punitive damage
awards, a small number of unusually high ratios can cause mis-
leading results. Consequently, Figure IX uses the median ratio
rather than the average ratio for each time period.
Figure IX shows two different patterns for Dallas and
Jackson counties. In Dallas County, the median ratio of puni-
tive damages to other damages remains stable during the first
two periods. The ratio for both 1970-73 and 1974-77 is 1.0, rep-
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FIGURE IX
MEDIAN RATIO OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES TO OTHER DAMAGES: 1970-88
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resenting a 1:1 ratio of punitive damages to other damages. The
ratio rises slightly in the third time period to 1.34, or 1.34:1. Af-
ter 1978-81, the ratio declines to 0.74 in the fourth time period
and to 0.67 in the final period. These results do not support the
reformers' claims. To the contrary, the ratio of punitive to
other damages decreases during the time period when the me-
dian punitive damage award rises (1978-81). This suggests that
in Dallas County, patterns in. the size of punitive damage
awards are not necessarily linked to patterns in the ratio of
such awards to compensatory awards.172 The reform rhetoric
presumes a direct, positive relationship in which both increase
dramatically.
In Jackson County, the median ratio of punitive damages
to other damages initially decreases, then gradually increases.
The ratio declines from .3.08 in 1970-73 to 1.98 in 1974-77. It
then increases to 2.5 in 1978-81 and 3.53 in 1982-85, before de-
creasing to 3.2 in the final time period. As in Dallas County,
the pattern for the median punitive damage award, shown in
Figure VII, does not correspond to the pattern in Figure IX.
The increase in the ratio does not translate into an increase in
the size of the typical punitive damage award.
Independent of the patterns in the ratios for Jackson arid
172. See Figure VI.
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Dallas Counties is the question of whether these ratios are too
high. The answer is not obvious because of a lack of compara-
tive standards. If the reformers' claims are used as a standard,
both sets of ratios appear quite low because the reformers refer
to ratios in the hundreds if not the thousands.m7s A more ap-
propriate source for a comparative standard might be the vari-
ous statutory provisions for multiple damages and recent tort
reforms. For instance, federal law allows treble damages in an-
titrust suits,17 and many states permit multiple damages in a
variety of situations. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
for example, allows multiple damages up to three times com-
pensatory damages.175 Of more relevance, a series of tort re-
form measures recently enacted in Texas provide new
standards for punitive damage awards.178
The Texas Omnibus Tort Reform Act of 1987 limits the
amount of exemplary damages recoverable in certain actions to
the greater of $200,000 or four times actual damages.1'7 Using
the 4:1 standard for comparison, the median ratios for Dallas
County are quite low. Only 3.5% (16 of 454) of the punitive
damage verdicts in Dallas County between 1970 and 1988 ex-
ceed the limits of the Texas law. Although the ratios for Jack-
son County are higher than those in Dallas County, most are
still below the 4:1 limit. Only 9.1% (21 of 223) of the punitive
damage verdicts in Jackson County exceed the limits of the
Texas law. Thus, for these two sites, any problems that might
exist with regard to the ratio of punitive damages to all other
damages are minor.
G. SUMMARY
In summary, the results of the study do not support the re-
formers' claims regarding patterns and changes in punitive
damage awards over time. Juries did not routinely award puni-
tive damages in Dallas and Jackson Counties, and no consistent
patterns of increasing incidence over time appeared. The puni-
tive damage rates for physical harm cases, including the high
visibility areas of medical malpractice and product liability,
were extremely low throughout the nineteen years examined.
173. See Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 10, at 1397.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
175. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1987).
176. See Montford & Barber, 1987 Tezas Tort Refoemu The Quest for a
Fairer and More Predietable Texas Civil Justice System(pts. 1 & 2), 25 Hous.
L. REv. 59, 66, 245, 31441 (1988).
177. TEx. Cirv. PRaC. & REM CODE ANN. § 41.007 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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Furthermore, the typical punitive damage award remained
modest. The upward trends existed only in the highest 25% of
the punitive damage award distribution, suggesting that there
were effectively two punitive damage systems in these sites:
one for the bulk of punitive damage cases, in which the size of
awards only slightly increases, and another for a small propor-
tion of the cases in which the size of awards does significantly
increase. Contrary to what might be expected, most of the
cases in this higher award system involved financial harm
rather than physical harm. What factors determine whether a
given case falls into one system or the other is unclear at this
time. Finally, the data did not show an increase in the percent-
age of the total award represented by punitive damages over
time or an increase in the ratios of punitive damages to other
damages.
Again, these two sites are only case studies, and cannot be
used to make generalizations about national trends. The find-
ings do provide a context, however, for interpreting the reform-
ers' claims about patterns and changes in the incidence and size
of punitive damage awards. The results of our study suggest a
skeptical approach to empirical claims made about patterns and
changes in punitive damage verdicts in recent years, as well as
the reform effort itself.
CONCLUSION
Tort reform is about fundamental change in the rules of
the game, changes that will clearly benefit certain interests.7 8
As the editor of one legal newspaper pointed out to his readers
at the end of a series of stories on tort reform and the insur-
ance crisis, "the current tort reform movement seeks not neu-
tral efficency-enhancing procedural changes, but substantive
legal revisions to rewrite the rules more in their [the reform-
ers'] favor."'1 9 This movement is predicated on a particular
characterization of the civil justice system and how the system
has changed in recent years. It draws its impetus from the
characterization of a system in crisis that is threatening the na-
tion's well-being and economic stability.180
Such a characterization, however, should be viewed skepti-
178. See Those Who Pay Most Lobby to Change Way Suits are Tied, Dam-
ages Awarded, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1986, § 2, at 31, col. 1.
179. Jost, Polemics Won't Solve Insurance Crisis, L-. Daily J., Dec. 9,
1985, at 2, col. 4.
180. See supra notes 58-91 and accompanying text.
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cally. Public policy problems, political scientists Cobb and
Elder note, are socially constructed* "They arise not so much
from events and circumstances as from the meanings that peo-
ple attribute to those events and circumstances."181 Each char-
acterization brings its own unique solutions and causal logic to
explain the problem.'a According to Cobb and Elder, the way
people define a problem has the effect of allocating responsibil-
ity or blame, judging the comparative social worth of different
groups and people, and aff rm ng or disapproving certain val-
ues, beliefs, and lifestyles. s To gain support for their charac-
terization of a civil justice system in crisis, the reformers appeal
to fear and anxiety that can be alleviated only by their ready-
made solutions.
The reformers' characterization is especially important be-
cause it provides the working context for any reforms that leg-
islators might enact. The findings presented in this Article
provide good reason to be skeptical of the veracity of the re-
formers' characterization. The findings challenge widespread
beliefs that punitive damages are awarded routinely, and in
large amounts, that the frequency and size of these awards are
rapidly increasing, and that these phenomena are national in
scope. Although accuracy might not be relevant to the reform-
ers' short-term goal of gaining access to the public policy
agenda, it is relevant to the efficacy of any reform proposals en-
acted. Policy changes based upon a characterization that is not
reasonably accurate are unlikely to succeed or fulfill the expec-
tations the reformers created.
Malcolm Feeley reached a similar conclusion in his study
of failed criminal justice reforms. He concluded that one can
find the roots of failure in the mistaken notion of a crisis in the
courts, in "the exaggerated assertions about the problems faced
by the courts, the historical perspective that informs (or, more
properly, fails to inform) so much analysis, and the easy - and
often wrong - answers implied in so many crisis-generated
discussions."'14
Tort reform illustrates a pathological aspect of the public
policy process: that in some situations gaining access to the
public policy agenda might undermine the efficacy of the poli-
18L R. COBB & C. ELDER, supimv note 55, at 172-73.
182. I at 174. To be successful the reformers must prevail in the battle
over meaning because "different definitions of policy problems tend to point to
different solution possibilities." Id.
183. I at 176.
184. TM. F Y, suimz note 54, at xi.
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cies subsequently enacted. Obtaining access to the agenda
involves controlling the meaning given to events and circum-
stances. The efficacy of policy changes depends on a reasonably
accurate assessment of reality. The approach used to gain ac-
cess to the agenda does not always undermine the policy
changes subsequently enacted, but this is the probable result
with regard to punitive damages and tort reform. Any changes
in the punitive damages system are likely to be based on an un-
founded, and perhaps manufactured,' ss notion of crisis and a
fundamental misunderstanding of the problem, the dynamics of
the system, and the pattern of change.' s
185. See &. HAYDEN, supra note 9, at 7; Daniels, supra note 9, at 309.
186. M. FEELEY, supra note 54, at 205.
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